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STUDENT COMMENTS
ANOTHER LOOK AT OUR FOUNDING FATHERS
AND THEIR PRODUCT: A RESPONSE TO
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL
EDWARD L. WHITE III*
[T]he Constitution of the United States not only con-
tained no guarantee in favor of slavery, but ... was in its
letter and spirit an anti-slavery instrument, demanding
the abolition of slavery as a condition of its own existence
as the supreme law of the land.'
Our Constitution was made only for a moral and reli-
gious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government
of any other.2
INTRODUCTION
During the bicentennial celebration of the United States
Constitution,3 Justice Thurgood Marshall4 announced that he
* B.A. 1984, Stetson University; M.A. 1989, University of Florida; J.D.
1989, University of Notre Dame; Thos. J. White Scholar, 1987-89. To my
wife and parents with love.
1. F. DOUGLASS, LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 261 (1962)
[hereinafter LIFE AND TIMES]. Douglass wrote the statement in his later life.
It was a reversal of his previous position of "no union with slaveholders." Id.
at 260-61. Douglass thought the federal government could abolish slavery if
people, who used "their powers for the abolition of slavery, were voted into
office." 2 F. DoucAss, THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 468
(P. Foner ed. 1950) [hereinafter LIFE AND WRITINGS].
2. 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 229 (C. Adams ed. 1854).
3. The bicentennial celebration will last from 1987 until 1991. The
celebration is meant to "recall the achievements of our Founders and the
knowledge and experience that inspired them, the nature of the government
they established, its origins, its character, and its ends, and the rights and
privileges of citizenship, as well as its attendant responsibilities." FIRST
REPORT ON THE COMMISSION ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 6 (1985).
Our Constitution was the first in which a people initiated a compact with
a government. The Constitution was written to bind the people and the
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would not "participate in the festivities with flag-waving fer-
vor. '"5 Instead, he would "quietly commemorate the suffering,
struggle, and sacrifice that has triumphed over much of what
'96
was wrong with the original document....
Justice Marshall made his comments on May 6, 1987, at the
annual seminar of the San Francisco Patent and Trademark
Law Association in Maui, Hawaii. 7 During the speech, Marshall
stressed that he did not find the founding fathers' "wisdom,
foresight, and sense of justice . . . particularly profound."8
government to a contract whereby the people relinquished some of their
natural rights to the government. At the same time, they reserved the rest of
their rights for themselves. The government, in turn, provided the necessary
order and security for the nation to remain peaceful and prosperous. If the
government breached its contract with the people, the people could regain
their natural rights and either return to the state of nature or enter into a
compact with another government. See J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 122-28 (T. Cook ed. 1947).
4. Thurgood Marshall is an Associate Justice on the United States
Supreme Court. President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed him in 1967 to fill
the seat vacated by Tom C. Clark. Before his appointment, Marshall was,
among other things, Solicitor General of the United States as well as Counsel
for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Legal
Defense Fund. He is the first black to sit on the Court. Marshall's
background sheds some light on his sensitivity toward slavery and the
treatment of blacks in our society. On Marshall's life as an attorney, see R.
BLAND, PRIVATE PRESSURE ON PUBLIC LAw: THE LEGAL CAREER OF JUSTICE
THURGOOD MARSHALL (1973).
5. Because Marshall's speech has been printed verbatim in the
Appendix to this student comment, the reader will be referred to the
Appendix rather than to another source. Marshall, infra, at app. 129.
Marshall's speech has been reprinted either completely or partially in
numerous newspapers and periodicals. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 7, 1987, at
A1, col. 4; Wash. Post, May 7, 1987, at Al, col. 1; Marshall, The Constitution: A
Living Document, 30 How. L. J. 623 (1987); Marshall, The Constitution's
Bicentennial: Commemorating the Wrong Document?, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1337
(1987); Marshall, Those the Constitution Left Out, 26JUDGES'J. 18 (1987).
6. Marshall, infra, at app. 129. Marshall stated that he will celebrate the
Constitution's bicentennial as a "living document, including the Bill of Rights
and the other amendments protecting individual freedoms and human
rights." Id. at app. 130.
7. Id. at app. 125. Marshall's speech has produced favorable and
unfavorable responses. For favorable replies, see N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1987,
at A18, col. 1; Wash. Post,July 5, 1987, at D7, col. 1; id.,July 4, 1987, at A19,
col. 1; id.,July 3, 1987, at A27, col. 1; id., May 18, 1987, at C3, col. 5; id., May
9, 1987, at A22, col. 1. For unfavorable responses, see Brownfeld, Constitution
was a Spectacular Success of Founding Fathers, 47 HUMAN EVENTS 12 (July 18,
1987); NAT'L REv.,June 5, 1987, at 16; N.Y. Times, June 6, 1987, § 1, at 27,
col. 1; Wash. Post, May 24, 1987, at A4, col. 3; id., May 14, 1987, at A25, col.
1; N.Y. Times, May 13, 1987, at D31, col. 1; Wash. Post, May 12, 1987, at
A19, col. 1.
8. Marshall, infra, at app. 125.
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Moreover, he thought the framers devised a "defective" gov-
ernment, which required "several amendments, a civil war, and
momentous social transformations to attain the system of con-
stitutional government, and its respect for the individual free-
doms and human rights, we hold as fundamental today." 9
Marshall specifically faulted the framers for not considering the
majority of American citizens when they crafted the Constitu-
tion.' o He underscored that the preamble's "We the People"
only included free white males-blacks and women were
excluded." The Justice further pointed out that the document
sanctioned slavery in two places:12 in article I, section 2, it
counted "other Persons" as three-fifths of "free Persons" for
representational purposes; in article I, section 9, it prohibited
the Congress from interfering with the international slave trade
until 1808.' According to Marshall, these "defects" stemmed
from the framers' "intentional" compromise of "moral princi-
ples."' 14 He contended that the Northern and the Southern
delegates compromised on the slave trade for their economic
well-being. The North allowed the sanctioning of slavery to
guarantee the perpetuation of the South's main source of
wealth.' 5 The South, in return, acquiesced to New England's
demand that the Congress have broad powers to regulate
commerce.'
6
Marshall is convinced that the framers' compromise "laid a
foundation for the tragic events" that followed the nation's
founding.' 7  These events-mainly the legal inequality of
9. Id. at app. 125-26.
10. Id. at app. 126.
11. Id.
12. As this student comment will discuss, the Constitution tolerated
slavery in fifteen places. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
13. Marshall, infra, at app. 126-27.
14. Id. at app. 126. Arguments similar to Marshall's have been made.
One of the earliest proponents of the position was Wendell Phillips, a
Garrisonian abolitionist. In three books, Phillips argued that the
Constitution was a compromise over slavery: CAN ABOLITIONISTS VOTE OR
TAKE OFFICE UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION? (1845); THE
CONSTITUTION: A PRO-SLAVERY COMPACT (1844); A REVIEW OF LYSANDER
SPOONER'S UNCONSTITUTIONABILITY OF SLAVERY (1847). For modern versions
of the argument, see R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975); A. HIGGINBOTHAM,
IN THE MATTER OF COLOR (1978); W. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK (1968); S.
LYND, CLASS CONFLICT, SLAVERY AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
(1968); Cohen, Thomas Jefferson and the Problem of Slavery, 56J. AM. HIST. 503
(1969).
15. Marshall, infra, at app. 126.
16. Id.
17. Id. at app. 127.
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blacks in our society-stemmed, he argued, "from the contra-
diction between guaranteeing liberty and justice to all, and
denying both to Negroes."' 8 Justice Marshall thus concluded
that the framers do not deserve credit for the present legal
treatment of blacks, because the document they drafted in 1787
neglected the principles necessary to adapt to a changing soci-
ety.' 9 In fact, Marshall argued that their document did not
even survive the Civil War.20 After the war, it was replaced, he
asserted, by a document that contains a "more promising basis
for justice and equality, the fourteenth amendment."'" The
new document protects "the life, liberty, and property of all
persons against deprivations without due process, and [it]
guarantee[s] equal protection of the laws" to all.22 Therefore,
Justice Marshall credited those who did not "acquiesce in out-
dated notions of 'liberty,' justice,' and 'equality,' and who
strived to better them." 23
Marshall's speech contains three arguments. First, the
framers did not draft the Constitution by which our nation is
bound, because their document did not protect all people.2 4
Second, the "original" document morally compromised the
slavery issue. Third, although Marshall did not say so forth-
rightly, he implied that the Constitution is immoral in those
areas that resulted from the compromise of morality.2 5 His last
point is significant, because people are not obligated to follow
an immoral document.
26
18. Id. at app. 128.
19. Id. at app. 129.
20. Id. at app. 128.
21. Id. Edwin M. Yoder Jr. pointed out that Marshall, who "argued the
school segregation case as counsel for the NAACP," should know that the
fourteenth amendment "proved to be an unreliable weapon of racial
equality." Wash. Post, May 14, 1987, at A25, col. 1. The sympathetic United
States Supreme Court in the early 1950s school cases "failed to find a clear
mandate against segregation in the 14th Amendment. Its origins were too
ambiguous." Id. Moreover, "as Marshall also knows but failed to mention in
Hawaii, the 14th Amendment was used by an earlier generation ofjudges far
more as a license for robber barons than as a charter of liberty for all." Id.
The fourteenth amendment should be viewed "not as a graft but as a branch
of the old trunk, drawing its vitality and meaning from it." Id.
22. Marshall, infra, at app. 128 (emphasis in original).
23. Id. at app. 129. Marshall, however, did not mention the names of the
people who deserve credit.
24. Id. at app. 126.
25. Id. at app. 125-26.
26. The notion that an immoral or unjust law does not bind in
conscience is a basic philosophical principle. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGICA, I-Il, Q 96, A. 4. See also SAINT AUGUSTINE, ON FREE CHOICE OF
THE WILL (A. Benjamin & L. Hackstaff trans. 1964). A law may be unjust in
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Marshall's critique of the Constitution parallels that of the
eighteenth and nineteenth century abolitionists, who branded
the document pro-slavery. Of the abolitionists, the Garrisoni-
ans most strongly condemned the Constitution. They thought
the document was contradictory because it included slavery
along with the concepts of liberty and justice. Besides regard-
ing the Constitution an instrument of incompatible parts, they
judged it an improper sectional compromise. Hence, the Gar-
risonians argued that people could not uphold the document in
good conscience.27
two senses. First, a law may be contrary to human welfare. Examples are
laws that are not directed to assist the common good, but are instead onerous
laws that direct the populace to satisfy their sovereign's cupidity or
advancement; laws that exceed the authority of their authors to draft such
laws; and laws that assign burdens unequally among the populace, even if the
laws are directed toward the common good. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, supra, I-
II, Q 96, A.4. As Saint Augustine wrote: "a law that is not just is not a law."
SAINT AUGUSTINE, supra, at 11. Laws that are contrary to human welfare are
never binding in conscience, unless to protect against creating scandal or
public disturbance; in that case, people should relinquish their right to
disobey the law, because the scafidal or public disturbance would cause more
harm to the public welfare. Second, a law may be contrary to divine good.
Examples are laws of a tyrant that lead people into idolatry or anything else
that goes against the divine law. Laws that are contrary to divine good never
bind in conscience and should always be disobeyed. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS,
supra, I-I, Q.96, A.4. See also the Encyclical Letters of His Holiness Pope Leo
XIII, Au milieu des sollicitudes (On the Church and State in France) (Feb. 16,
1892); Sapientiae Christianae (On Christians as Citizens) (Jan. 10, 1890),
reprinted in 2 THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 277, 211 (C. Carlen ed. 1981).
27. 2 LIFE AND WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 118; W. PHILLIPS, SPEECHES,
LECTURES AND LETTERS 351, 375, 537 (1892). Up until the early part of the
twentieth century, slavery was thought to have played a major role at the
Philadelphia Convention. That view changed with THE FRAMING OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1913), in which its author, Max Farrand, downplayed slavery's
role at the Convention. Id. at 107-08, 110. According to Farrand, the main
conflict at Philadelphia was between the small and large states over the
question of proportional representation in the Congress. Id. at 108, 110. It
was "the great compromise of the convention and of the constitution. None
other was to be placed quite in comparison with it." Id. at 105.
Although Farrand's view was predominant in the historiography of the
Convention for most of the twentieth century, it was challenged. In AN
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(1952), Charles A. Beard argued that the motivational force at the
Convention was not the conflict between the small and large states, but
economics. Id. at 324. He contended that financial self-interest guided the
document's framers and ratifiers. Id. at 324-25. These men represented,
with few exceptions, the money, public securities, manufacturing, and trade
and shipping interest groups of the country. Id. at 324. As a result of the
new government, these conservative delegates received direct, immediate,
and personal economic benefits. Id. at 188, 324. In Beard's opinion, these
men created a national government that restricted the democratic aspirations
1989]
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In contrast to Marshall's argument, the following discus-
sion will demonstrate that the document was an instrument of
compatible parts. Moreover, it will demonstrate that the fram-
ers did not act immorally by allowing the slavery provisions
into the Constitution. Instead, they tolerated what they consid-
ered a lesser evil-slavery-for what they considered a greater
good- the creation of a new nation. 28 The framers reasonably
thought that the Deep South 29 would not have become part of
a nation that outlawed slavery.30 If the Deep South left the
Philadelphia Convention, the framers concluded that other
states would have also departed the Convention and the dream
of a new nation would have died.3' To prevent the collapse of
the Convention, the framers allowed the institution of slavery
of the states in order to steer the national economy. Id. at 325. John Hope
Franklin followed Beard's line of reasoning in FROM SLAVERy To FREEDOM
(4th ed. 1974). He called the Convention a "conservative reaction" to "stem
the tide of social revolution" that was occurring at the local level. Id. at 98.
Because the framers' chief motivation was protecting private property
interests, they drafted a document that effectively smothered local, social
reform movements. Id. at 100. The antislavery movements were, of course,
affected.
Unlike Beard or Franklin, William Freehling contended in The Founding
Fathers and Slavery, 77 AM. HIST. REV. 81 (1972), that the framers left slavery a
"crippled, restricted, peculiar institution," by way of the Northwest
Ordinance and the 1808 international slavetrade provision. Id. at 91. Along
similar lines, Don E. Fehrenbacher suggested that the Constitution was
"bifocal" in nature. D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED Scorr CASE 27 (1978). He
argued that the framers recognized slavery's existence, while limiting it in a
way that they hoped would cause its termination. Id. Fehrenbacher wrote:
"It is as though the framers were half-consciously trying to frame two
constitutions, one for their own time and the other for the ages, with slavery
viewed bifocally-this is, plainly visible at their feet, but disappearing when
they lifted their eyes." Id.
As should be clear, the question of slavery's impact on the framing of the
Constitution has been disputed and probably will be in the future. This
student comment proposes that our founding fathers tolerated the
institution in order to craft a new document that would lead the states past
the difficulties they were experiencing under the Articles of Confederation.
By doing so, they created a government that would accept the abolition of the
institution when the time had come.
28. See infra notes 250, 262-63, 294 and accompanying text.
29. In this student comment, the Deep South refers to South Carolina
and Georgia. To some extent, North Carolina should be included in the
definition, but it did not have as unified a pro-slavery position as did the
other two states.
30. See infra notes 61, 84-87, 163, 180-82, 252-55, 265-66, 268, 286-87
and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 84-87, 265-66, 268-76, 286-87 and accompanying text.
See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 1-10 (A. Hamilton, J. Jay, & J. Madison), for a
discussion of the Philadelphia Convention's potential breakup had the
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into the document under limited circumstances. Because the
framers intended to achieve a greater good by tolerating a
lesser evil, they acted morally. 2
Part I of this student comment will highlight the constitu-
tional provisions that addressed the subject of slavery. 3 Part II
will examine the slavery debates in both the federal and state
ratifying conventions. Part III will address Marshall's assertion
that the framers intentionally compromised their morality. The
conclusion will underscore that the document, though incom-
plete, is moral.
I. THE SLAVERY PROVISIONS
The Philadelphia Convention represented every state
except Rhode Island.34 It met from May 14, 1787, through
September 17, 1787," 5 with fifty-five delegates in attendance.3 6
The document the delegates drafted tolerated slavery in fifteen
places, five directly and ten indirectly. The five explicit slavery
provisions 37 are
Constitution not been ratified and the consequences that would have
occurred from the dismantlement.
32. See infra notes 256-61, 264 and accompanying text.
33. Numerous historical books and articles have been written about
slavery. Some of the best works are SLAVE TESTIMONY: Two CENTURIES OF
LETTERS, SPEECHES, INTERVIEWS, AND AUTOBIOGRAPHIES (J. Blassingame ed.
1977); C. RICE, THE RISE AND FALL OF BLACK SLAVERY (1975); A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN NORTH AMERICA (W. Rose ed. 1976);
Davis, Slavery and the Post-World War II Historians, 103 DAEDALUS 1 (1974).
34. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 557 (M.
Farrand ed. 1911) [hereinafter M. FARRAND].
35. For a full account of the debates, see 5 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION U.
Elliot ed. 1863) [hereinafter J. ELLIOT]; 1-3 M. FARRAND, supra note 34; J.
MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1966).
See also W. BENTON, 1787: DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1986).
36. See 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 557-59, for a complete list of the
delegates. See also M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION 14-41
(1913), for a sketch of the Convention and its members.
37. The slavery provisions laid out in this student comment were drawn
from Finkelman, Slavery and the Constitutional Convention, in BEYOND
CONFEDERATION 190-91 (R. Beeman, S. Botein, & E. Carter eds. 1987).
Finkelman rightly claimed that the United States Constitution tolerated
slavery in fifteen places. Other scholars have offered lower numbers. For
example, James McPherson set the number at three. J. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL
BY FIRE 2 (1982). Clinton Rossiter claimed slavery appeared in the
Constitution in just four places. C. ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION
266-67 (1966). These authors offered shortsighted views, because they
ignored some of the direct provisions and all of the indirect provisions.
William M. Wiecek cited eleven slavery provisions within the Constitution
that directly and indirectly tolerated slavery. W. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF
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(1) Article I, section 2. Representation in the lower House
of Congress would be apportioned among the states based on
population, which would be computed by counting all free per-
sons and three-fifths of the slaves. The same basis of computa-
tion would be used should any "direct tax" be levied on the
states;
(2) Article I, section 9, clause 1. The Congress was pre-
cluded from ending the states' involvement in the international
slave trade before 1808;
(3) Article I, section 9, clause 4. The provision repeated
what was already included in article I, section 2. It prohibited
any "capitation" or other "direct tax" that did not conform to
the three-fifths clause;
(4) Article IV, section 2, clause 3. The states could not
emancipate fugitive slaves. Moreover, fugitives had to be
returned to their owners "on demand"; and
(5) Article V. The Congress could not amend the slave
trade and "direct tax" clauses until 1808.
The five explicit provisions were supplemented by ten clauses
that indirectly tolerated slavery.3 8 For example, the Congress
ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 62-63 (1977).
Although Wiecek and Finkelman almost agreed on the number of provisions,
Wiecek did not distinguish between the direct and indirect protection of the
institution as did Finkelman.
38. The ten implicit slavery provisions are
(1) Art. I, § 8, cl. 15. The Congress had the power to call "forth the
Militia" to "suppress Insurrections";
(2) Art. I, § 9, cl. 5. Taxes on exports were prevented. In that way, the
staple products of slave labor, for example, rice, could not be taxed; thereby,
slavery would be free from any indirect taxation;
(3) Art. I, § 10, ci. 2. The states could not tax exports, which again
protected slavery from indirect taxation by non-slaveholding states;
(4) Art. II, § 1, cl. 2. The electoral college would be used to elect the
president based on congressional representation. The three-fifths clause
would be used to compute the representation in the House;
(5) Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Federal diversity jurisdiction was limited to
"citizens of different states," which prevented slaves and, possibly, free
blacks from bringing their cases to a federal court. The pro-slavery
ramification of this clause appeared only after the United States Supreme
Court decided Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857);
(6) Art. IV, § 1. The states had to give "Full Faith and Credit" to the
laws and judicial proceedings of other states. As such, the free states had to
recognize the laws of slavery;
(7) Art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. The privileges and immunities clause was
restricted to "citizens." Thus, slaves and, in some cases, free blacks were not
protected by this provision;
(8) Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. Fugitives from justice had to be returned to the
state that pursued them. The clause ensured the slave states that the other
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had the power to call "forth the Militia" to "suppress Insurrec-
tions," which could include slave uprisings.39
The slavery provisions represented the compromise
needed to unify the differences among the states. James
Madison commented during the federal convention that the
distinct interests of the states "resulted ... principally from the
effects of their having or not having slaves. These two causes
concurred in forming the great division of interests in the
United States. It did not lie between the large and the small
States. It lay between the Northern and Southern."4
Although Madison was correct in noting that the conflict
derived from slavery, he was incorrect in saying that the differ-
ences were clearly drawn between the North and the South.
His statement implied that the regions were monolithic. They
were not. In fact, the division was not even between the slave
and the non-slave states.4 ' Except for the Deep South, the
other parts of the confederacy held inconsistent slavery posi-
tions.42 The conflict was instead between the delegates who
wanted slavery included in the Constitution and those who
wanted it excluded. In this student comment, the two groups
will be referred to as the pro-inclusion and the anti-inclusion
delegates. To be sure, the distinction is not meant to suggest
that all anti-inclusion delegates were enlightened enough to
want the institution abolished. For various reasons, which this
student comment will explain, few, if any, were prepared to
battle that issue fully at the Philadelphia Convention.
The debates on the slavery provisions demonstrated the
divided attitudes the delegates held toward the institution.
Part II will address the pro- and anti-inclusion positions as well
states would return to them the whites and free blacks who had violated the
slave codes;
(9) Art. IV, § 4. The United States government had to protect states
from "domestic violence," which could include slave rebellions. This clause
complemented art. I, § 8, para. 15; and
(10) Art. V. Three-fourths of the states were needed to ratify the
Constitution. This provision enabled the slave states to veto any
constitutional changes that affected slavery.
Finkelman, supra note 37, at 191-92.
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
40. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 486 (30 June 1787). Rufus King of
Massachusetts also thought the difference in interests rested between the
Southern and Eastern states. Id. at 566 (10July 1787).
41. The six principle slave states were Delaware, Georgia, Maryland,
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia.
42. W. WIECEK, supra note 37, at 64.
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as the interplay of the delegates who subscribed to those
viewpoints.
II. THE DEBATES ON APPORTIONMENT AND THE SLAVE TRADE
In his speech, Justice Marshall highlighted two of the five
explicit slavery clauses.43 The two clauses concerned the
apportionment of the House of Representatives and the regula-
tion of the international slave traffic. 44 The debates on those
provisions showed the rift between the pro- and anti-inclusion
delegates. The debates also showed the need for a moderate,
tolerant position.45
A. The Apportionment Debates
At the Philadelphia Convention, the delegates first consid-
ered the subject of slavery in their discussion of apportion-
ment-the allotment or distribution of representatives in the
Congress.46 At issue was whether slaves would be counted
toward each state's population for purposes of apportionment.
During the debates, the Deep South made its position clear:
the region would only enter a union that included slaves in its
representational scheme.47 The underlying basis for the unity
43. Marshall, infra, at app. 126-27.
44. In this student comment, the terms slave traffic and slave trade refer
to the international maritime importation of slaves from non-American areas.
When the terms are meant to refer to inter- or intrastate trading it will be
specified. For more information on the African slave trade, see, e.g., D.
DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 1770-1823
(1975) [hereinafter SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION]; D. DAVIS, THE
PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE (1966); DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE
OF THE HISTORY OF THE SLAVE TRADE IN AMERICA (E. Donnan ed. 1930); W.
DuBoIs, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE TO THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, 1638-1870 (1896); J. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO
FREEDOM (4th ed. 1974); E. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM
(1975); U. PHILLIPS, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY (1918); C. RICE, THE RISE
AND FALL OF BLACK SLAVERY (1975).
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 9. William Few, a Georgia delegate, wrote,
in approximately 1816, that at the federal convention "[i]t was believed to be
of the utmost importance to concede to different opinions so far as to
endeavor to meet opposition on middle ground, and to form a Constitution
that might preserve the union of the States." 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at
423.
46. The debates on apportionment began on May 29, 1787. 1 M.
FARRAND, supra note 34, at 15.
47. See infra notes 71-73, 107, 172-74, 252-54, 265-66, 286 and
accompanying text.
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of the Deep South was its firm belief that slavery was proper as
well as essential to its existence.48
In an attempt to strengthen its political power, the Deep
South wanted slaves to be counted equally with whites.4 9 On
first blush, the demand may seem puzzling; the region
appeared to be calling for the equality of blacks. In reality, the
region only wanted slaves to be considered on the same level as
whites in order to bolster its political position in the Con-
gress.5" It did not want blacks placed on a par with whites in
any other respect.5" Under the Deep South's scheme, the slave
states would have controlled 49.9 percent of the Congress.52
The slave states could have gained a voting majority by increas-
ing their number of slaves. Owing to the scheme's extreme-
ness, however, the anti-inclusion forces would not agree to it.5 3
During the apportionment debates, the anti-inclusion dele-
gates also attempted to enhance their political position. They
proposed that slaves not be counted.54 Their proposition
would have given the slave states only a forty-one percent share
of the Congress.5 5 The anti-inclusion delegates saw the Deep
South's scheme as illogical. They could not comprehend the
consistency of considering slaves as both people and property
for purposes of representation. Elbridge Gerry of Massachu-
setts argued that "[t]he idea of property ought not to be the
rule of representation. Blacks are property . . .why should
their representation be increased to the southward on account
of the number of slaves, than horses or oxen to the north?" 56
48. See infra notes 238, 251, 267, 283 and accompanying text.
49. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 580 (P. Butler, Gen. C. Pinckney, 11
July 1787).
50. Goldwin, Why Blacks, Women and Jews are not Mentioned in the
Constitution, 83 COMMENTARY 28, 30 (1987).
51. Id.
52. D. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS
1765-1820, at 180 (1971).
53. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 561 (W. Paterson, 9 July 1787), 581
(J. Madison, 11 July 1787), 586 (R. King, 11 July 1787).
54. 5 J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 296 (G. Mason, 11 July 1787); 1 M.
FARRAND, supra note 34, at 561 (W. Paterson, 9 July 1787); Goldwin, supra
note 50, at 30.
55. D. ROBINSON, supra note 52, at 180.
56. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 205-06 (11 June 1787). William
Paterson of New Jersey used language similar to Elbridge Gerry's in his
opposition to the federal ratio. Paterson "could regard negroes slaves in no
light but as property. They are not free agents, have no personal liberty, no
faculty of acquiring property, but on the contrary are themselves property,
and like other property entirely at the will of the Master." Id. at 561 (9 July
1787).
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In addition, the anti-inclusion delegates thought the framers
would mock the theory of representation by counting blacks.57
According to the theory, every person who is counted has an
impact on lawmaking.58 But, under any system that included
slaves, only slaveowners would participate in the process.
Slaves, therefore, would not be truly represented in the federal
legislature.59
The anti-inclusion delegates' proposal was also unrealistic,
and the slave states would not accept it.60 Besides decreasing
the political power of the South, the plan would have placed an
unfair economic burden on the slaveholding states. In The Fed-
eralist No. 54, James Madison asked:
Would the convention have been impartial or consistent
if they had rejected the slaves from the list of inhabitants,
when the shares of representation were to be calculated;
and inserted them on the lists when the tariff of contribu-
tions was to be adjusted? Could it be reasonably expected
that the southern states would concur in a system which
considered their slaves in some degree as men, when bur-
dens were to be imposed, but refused to consider them in
the same light when advantages were to be conferred?6
The method of apportionment the delegates finally accepted
was a compromise between the extreme positions of the pro-
and anti-inclusion delegates.
On June 11, 1787, James Wilson of Pennsylvania sug-
gested that the representation of each state be based on the
total number of free inhabitants "and of every other descrip-
tion three fifths to one free inhabitant."62 Wilson's recommen-
57. 2J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 227 (M. Smith, 20 June 1788); Goldwin,
supra note 50, at 29.
58. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 6 (R. King, 14 July 1787).
59. Goldwin, supra note 50, at 29. Neither the pro- nor the anti-slavery
sides considered "[t]he humanity of blacks . . . the subject of the three fifths
clause; voting power in Congress was the subject." Id. at 30. For the
prevalent attitude among American whites toward blacks, see infra notes 237-
38, 251 and accompanying text.
60. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 205.
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 279-80 (J. Madison) (M. Beloff 2d ed.
1987) (emphasis added). Alexander Hamilton asked the New York ratifying
convention: "Would it be just to compute these slaves in the assessment of
taxes, and discard them from the estimate in the apportionment of
representation? Would it be just to impose a singular burden, without
conferring some adequate advantage?" 2J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 237 (20
June 1788).
62. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 205. Later in the debates, James
Wilson questioned his proposition. He could
not [understand] on what principle the admission of blacks in the
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dation was not novel. It had been known under the Articles of
Confederation as the federal ratio.6" The formula was used to
determine the contributions of each state to the confederate
government.6 4 Moreover, eleven of the thirteen states had
adopted the formula. 65 Under the three-fifths scheme, the
South would control 46.5 percent of the Congress.6 6 Even
though the South would be in the voting minority, some dele-
gates feared the region could raise its representational power
by increasing its number of slaves. 67 The fear was unfounded,
however, because increasing the number of slaves at the three-
fifths ratio would have required a substantial number of slaves.
Even under the representational scheme that the Deep South
proposed, the North would still have held 50.1 percent of the
vote.68 The anti-inclusion delegates' concern was even less
substantiated, because, at the time, only South Carolina and
Georgia appeared in need of importing slaves.69
Any opposition 70 to Wilson's plan was silenced by three
delegates from the Deep South who had abandoned their
extreme posture for the more plausible moderate plan. Wil-
liam Davie of North Carolina argued that his state "would
proportion of three fifths could be explained. Are they admitted as
Citizens? Then why are they not admitted on an equality with White
Citizens? Are they admitted as property? Then why is not other
property admitted into the computation?
Id. at 587 (11 July 1787). Wilson's befuddlement represented the confusion
of American law. The law viewed black slaves as both property and persons.
THE FEDERALIST No. 54 (J. Madison); D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 27, at 16,
32.
63. Gerlach, Toward 'A Mlore Perfect Union'.- Connecticut, the Continental
Congress, and the Constitutional Convention, 34 CONN. HIST. Soc. BULL. 65, 73
(July 1969). The Continental Congress had frequently discussed the three-
fifths formula and had embodied it in the requisition of April 18, 1783. 4J.
ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 31 (W. Davie, 24 July 1787); Gerlach, supra, at 73.
The provision classified blacks as "three-fifths of all other persons not
comprehended in the foregoing description [that is, all free persons]." 24
THE JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 260 (W. Ford
ed. 1934).
64. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 562 (R. King, 9 July 1787).
65. Id. Gerlach, supra note 63, at 72.
66. D. ROBINSON, supra note 52, at 180.
67. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
68. D. ROBINSON, supra note 52, at 180.
69. 4J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 100 (R. Spaight, 26July 1788), 101, 178
(J. Iredell, 26, 29 July 1788).
70. Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, for example, opposed James
Wilson's plan. He thought the federal ratio would be an accurate formula for
taxation, but not for representation. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 205-06
(I IJune 1787).
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never confederate on any terms that did not rate [slaves] at
least as three fifths."'" Similar promises came from Pierce But-
ler and Charles Pinckney, both from South Carolina.7" They
reminded the Convention that the Carolinas and Georgia
would never enter a nation that did not protect slavery.73
Whether or not these men were bluffing, the remainder of the
delegates were unwilling to gamble the union's creation."
Because the Deep South stood firmly to its position, the Con-
vention had every reason to assume the veracity of these state-
ments. Moreover, the moral indifference of many delegates
toward slavery allowed them to reach their decision more
easily.
Wilson was aware of the tension between the pro- and anti-
inclusion delegates and offered his plan to promote harmony in
the Convention.75  His proposal worked. The delegates
71. Id. at 593 (12 July 1787).
72. Id. at 592-93 (12 July 1787).
73. Id. at 605 (P. Butler, 13 July 1787), 95 (C. Pinckney, 13 July 1787).
74. Some evidence exists to show that the Deep South was bluffing about
not joining the union without its slaves. During the South Carolina ratifying
debates, Charles C. Pinckney, in response to those who opposed the
Constitution because it placed duties on slave importation but not on
shipping, said: "[T]he Southern States are weak.., we are so weak that by
ourselves we could not form a union strong enough for the purpose of
effectively protecting each other. Without union with the other States, South
Carolina must soon fall .. " 4J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 283 (17 Jan. 1788).
The only person during the Philadelphia Convention to raise the issue of
the Deep South's weakness was Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts. See infra
notes 176-78 and accompanying text. Gorham was stifled by the other
delegates, however, because they feared that such remarks would cause the
Deep South to leave the Convention. See supra notes 66, 71-73 and
accompanying text; see also infra notes 84-87, 107, 172-74, 180-82, 251-55,
265-66, 286-87 and accompanying text. The delegates' attitude tends to
raise the belief that they did not realize the trouble the Deep South was in;
then again, all of the states were having economic, social, and political
problems. See infra note 239. Furthermore, Pinckney's statement was made
to force the South Carolina delegation into ratifying the document, so he
might have overstated the problem. Pinckney thought the document
protected the Deep South's interests. See infra notes 207-08 and
accompanying text.
In retrospect, one can argue that the framers should have pressed the
Deep South harder to yield its pro-slavery position. But, that is the beauty of
hindsight. One can always say what should have been done. The problem is
knowing what to do when the event is occurring. Still, a great lesson can be
learned from studying the Philadelphia Convention and the state ratifying
debates: "moral problems . . . must be faced and met as early as possible;
postponement is not solution, and political bargains and compromises
merely postpone problems to be dealt with by future generations." M.
MELLON, EARLY AMERICAN VIEWS ON NEGRO SLAVERY 167 (1969).
75. Finkelman, supra note 37, at 197.
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approved the proposition chiefly because it was an accepted
concept. 76 Furthermore, it affirmed the contemporary law,
which considered slaves in some respects as people and in
other respects as property. 77 Under the three-fifths scheme,
slaves could be counted for representational purposes without
the slave states needing to declare whether slaves were people
or property. 78 In turn, the non-slave states could also neglect
the slave's legal status. 7' Each side accepted the law as it was.
Any change would come later, when they were ready. The
important point was that the opportunity for change could
occur. For the time being, though, the federal ratio would be
used for the apportionment of representation as well as for
direct taxation.8
0
76. 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 36 (R. King, 17 Jan. 1788); Gerlach,
supra note 63, at 73.
77. Under the civil law, slaves were classified as property. Under the
criminal law, for example, slaves were classified as persons: they were held
accountable for their misdeeds and were punishable just as any free person.
THE FEDERALIST No. 54 (. Madison). D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 27, at 16,
32.
78. C. MEE, THE GENIUS OF THE PEOPLE 224 (1987).
79. Id.
80. According to historian Don Fehrenbacher,
in the apportionment of representation and direct taxes, slaves were
not treated as property any more than free persons were treated as
property, but both were regarded in part as measures of wealth.
The three-fifths compromise did not necessarily imply that a slave
was 60 per cent human being and 40 per cent property. Instead, it
incorporated a differential estimate of his wealth-producing capacity
as a person. It reflected a widespread belief in the relative inefficiency
of slave labor.
D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 27, at 22 (emphasis in original).
Fehrenbacher's position is in the minority among historians. The more pop-
ular argument, advanced especially by Winthrop D.Jordan, contends that the
three-fifths provision "embodied more logic than has commonly been sup-
posed. For the slave was, by social definition, both property and man, simul-
taneously partaking of the qualities of both; the three-fifths rule treated him
accordingly, adding only a ludicrous fractional exactitude." W. JORDAN,
WHITE OVER BLACK 322 (1968).
The draft of the three-fifths clause that the framers accepted stated:
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the
several states which may be included within this Union, according to
their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to
the whole number of free persons, including those bound to servi-
tude for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three
fifths of all other persons.
2 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 590.
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In the state ratifying conventions,"1 both the pro-inclusion
and the anti-inclusion delegates presented the provision to
their conventions as a victory for their side. In the South, the
delegates applauded the clause as "an immense concession in
our favor." 2 Indeed, it was "the only practicable rule or crite-
rion for representation.""3 In the North, the delegates assured
their conventions that the clause was necessary to establish a
nation. In New York, Alexander Hamilton stated that "[iut
became necessary ... to compromise, or the Convention must
have dissolved without effecting any thing."'8 4 He continued by
pointing out that the clause resulted from "the spirit of accom-
modation, which governed the Convention.... [W]ithout this
indulgence," he concluded, "no union could possibly have
been formed."8" Even those New York delegates who publicly
condemned slavery held similar opinions. Melancton Smith,
for instance, said he was "persuaded we must yield this point,
in accommodation to the Southern States."' 86 Indeed, the dele-
gates from the non-slave states thought the slave states would
not join the union without concessions on the slavery issue.87
In their minds, they were not giving the slave states anything
new. The wide acceptance of the federal ratio was demon-
strated in the Massachusetts ratifying convention: Nathaniel
Gorham said that the three-fifths ratio was "pretty near the just
proportion" between blacks and whites.88 Likewise, his col-
league Rufus King declared that the ratio "was adopted,
because it was the language of all America."" According to
81. Of the state ratifying conventions, only the Georgia debates are not
extant.
82. 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 31 (W. Davie, 24 July 1788), 276 (E.
Rutledge, 16 Jan. 1788); 3 id. at 457-59 (G. Nicholas &J. Madison, 15 June
1788); Ramsay, An Address to the Freemen of South Carolina on the Subject of the
Federal Constitution (1788), in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 378 (P. Ford ed. 1888).
83. Ramsay, supra note 82, at 378.
84. 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 236 (20 June 1788).
85. Id. at 237 (20 June 1788). Richard Harrison, another New York
delegate, agreed with Alexander Hamilton. He said to the New York
delegation that "[w]ithout [compromise] no union could have been formed."
Id. at 269 (23 June 1788).
86. Id. at 243 (21 June 1788).
87. See supra notes 61, 84-86 and accompanying text; see also infra notes
180-82, 252-55, 263-66, 268, 286-87 and accompanying text.
88. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 580 (11 July 1787).
89. 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 36 (R. King, 17 Jan. 1788); Gerlach,
supra note 63, at 73.
ANOTHER LOOK
the law of the day, Gorham and King's statements were proba-
bly correct. 90
To be sure, the framers did not think they had the power
to establish a government; they thought they only had the
authority to suggest one.9 ' Consequently, they had to recom-
mend a government that could be approved by the states.9"
Once the nation was established, the government could be
modified by article V. The federal legislature, thereafter,
would be responsible for realizing and implementing change.93
The Convention's concern about the Deep South's pro-
slavery stance was even more apparent during the heated
debates on the slave traffic. The region was just as firm in its
position.94 Tolerance was even more necessary, because the
desired nation seemed in peril.
B. The Slave Trade Debates
While the Constitutional Convention was taking place, the
Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery
was also gathering in Philadelphia.95 In June, the Society
drafted a provision to ban the international slave trade.9 6
Tench Coxe, the secretary of the Society, gave the petition to
Benjamin Franklin (the Society's president97 ) to introduce at
90. W. WIECEK, supra note 37, at 69.
91. 2J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 236 (A. Hamilton, 20 June 1788).
92. See infra note 277 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 294-302 and accompanying text; C. BOWEN, MIPRACLE
AT PHILADELPHIA 204 (1966). George Washington thought legislative
authority was the only proper and effective way for abolition to occur. S.
COMMINS, BASIC WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 519 (1948).
94. To learn more about the pro-slavery ideology, consult the following
sources: T. DEW, J. HAMMOND, W. HARPER & W. SIMMS, THE PRO-SLAVERY
ARGUMENT (1968); SLAVERY DEFENDED: THE VIEWS OF THE OLD SOUTH (E.
McKitrich ed. 1963); Donald, The Proslavery Argument Reconsidered, 37 J. S.
HIST. 3 (1971).
95. Established by the Quakers in 1775, the Pennsylvania Society for
Promoting the Abolition of Slavery was the first anti-slavery organization in
America. J. MCPHERSON, supra note 37, at 38. In general, abolitionists made
fragmentary attempts to influence the Philadelphia Convention. SLAVERY IN
THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 44, at 321. Several excellent studies on
the anti-slavery movement exist. See id.; D. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY
IN WESTERN CULTURE (1966); M. DILLON, THE ABOLITIONISTS: THE GROWTH
OF A DISSENTING MINORITY (1974); E. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN
lREFEDOM (1975); J. STEWART, HOLY WARRIORS (1976); G. SORIN,
ABOLITIONISM: A NEW PERSPECTIVE (1972); Dillon, The Abolitionists: A Decade
q/ listoriography, 35J. S. HIST. 500 (1969).
96. F. BARBASH, THE FOUNDING 148 (1987).
97. The Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery
1989]
90 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 4
the Convention.9" Along with the petition, Coxe included his
"opinion that it would be a very improper season and place to
hazard the Application considering it was an over zealous act of
honest men." 99 Franklin apparently concurred with Coxe's
assessment. He neither mentioned the petition at the Conven-
tion nor urged the suppression of the slave trade.' 0 0
Franklin and Coxe's actions evidenced their awareness of
late eighteenth-century politics. Few, if any, who knew the
politics of 1787 could have honestly thought that the delegates
would, or could, abolish the slave trade.' 0 ' The situation was
made Benjamin Franklin aware of slavery's injustice. For more on the matter,
see M. MELLON, EARLY AMERICAN VIEWS ON NEGRO SLAVERY 5-28 (1969).
98. The petition read:
To the revival of this trade The Society ascribe part of the Obloquy
with which foreign Nations have branded our infant states. In vain
will be their Pretensions to a love of liberty or regard for national
Character, while they share in the profits of a Commerce that can
only be conducted upon Rivers of human tears and Blood.
By all the Attributes, therefore, of the Deity which are offended by
this inhuman traffic-by the Union of our whole species in a
common Ancestor and by all the Obligations which result from it-
by the apprehensions and terror of the righteous Vengeance of God
in national Judgements-by the certainty of the great and awful day
of retribution-by the efficacy of the prayers of good Men, which
would only insult the majesty of Heaven, if offered up in behalf of
our Country while the Inequity we deplore continues among us-by
the sanctity of the Christian name-by the Pleasures of domestic
Connections and the pangs which attend their Dissolution-by the
Captivity and Sufferings of our American brethren in Algiers which
seem to be intended by divine Providence to awaken us to a sense of
the Injustice and Cruelty of dooming our African Brethren to
perpetual Slavery and Misery-by a regard to the Consistency of
principles and Conduct which should mark the Citizens of
Republics-by the magnitude and intensity of our desires to
promote the happiness of those millions of intelligent beings who
will probably cover this immense Continent with national life-and
by every other consideration that religion Reason Policy and.
Humanity can suggest-The Society implores the present
Convention to make the Suppression of the African trade in the
United States, a part of their important deliberations.
Tench Coxe and others to the Philadelphia Convention, June 1787, in MSS.
of the Pennsylvania Abolition Society, I, 17, Historical Society of Penn-
sylvania (microfilm) (emphasis in original). See also F. BARBASH, supra note 96,
at 148-49.
99. 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 361.
100. F. BARBASH, supra note 96, at 149.
101. Id. Thomas Dawes told the Massachusetts ratifying convention that
"[i]t would not do to abolish slavery ... and so destroy what our southern
brethren consider as property." 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 41 (18 Jan.
1788). The Declaration of Independence articulated property rights and,
thereby, legitimized slave property. Freehling, The Founding Fathers and
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especially true of the fifty-five delegates, approximately twenty
five of whom were slaveowners.t 0 2 The greater part of the anti-
inclusion delegates,10 3 therefore, came to realize a key point:
to create a federal government, they would need to tolerate
slavery.' 0 4 Thus, the most they could strive for at the framing
was the containment of the system.'
0 5
Even before the Committee of Detailt 06-the committee
that was ordered to add detail and give coherence to the Con-
vention's resolutions-evaluated the slave trade provision, the
Deep South stressed to the Convention the importance it
placed on slavery. General Charles Pinckney of South Carolina
told the delegates that "if the Committee should fail to insert
some security to the Southern States against an emancipation
of slaves, and taxes on exports, he should be bound by duty to
Slavery, 77 AM. HIST. REV. 81, 83 (1972). The eminent domain provision in
the Constitution guaranteed the slaveholders their property rights. The
government could not take slaves from their owners, unless for a public
purpose and with just compensation. DOCUMENTS OF UPHEAVAL 200 (T.
Nelson ed. 1966). See also Berns, Comment on Rowan, 47 MD. L. REV. 22, 24
(1987).
102. The framers who owned productive slaves included John Blair,
Virginia; Pierce Butler, South Carolina; Alexander Martin, North Carolina;
George Mason, Virginia; Edmund Randolph, Virginia; John Rutledge, South
Carolina; Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, Maryland; Richard Dobbs Spaight,
North Carolina; Charles Pinckney, South Carolina; Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney, South Carolina; and George Washington, Virginia.
Delegates who owned domestic slaves included William Richardson
Davie, North Carolina; John Dickinson, Delaware; William Samuel Johnson,
Connecticut; William Livingston, New Jersey; Luther Martin, Maryland;
James Madison, Virginia; John Francis Mercer, Maryland; Robert Morris,
Pennsylvania; George Read, Delaware; James Wilson, Pennsylvania; and
George Wythe, Virginia.
C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 151 (1952); C. MEE, supra note 78, at 154.
103. George Mason, for one, did not accept the slavery provisions. He
never signed the Constitution, as a result.
104. See infra notes 133-41, 267-76, 283-87 and accompanying text.
105. After creating the Constitution, the founding fathers' actions left the
institution of slavery crippled and restricted. They attacked slavery at its
weakest point. As the nineteenth century progressed, they rid it from the
North and from the Northwest Territories, pushed it south, and confined it to
the Deep South. 2J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 115 (W. Heath, 30Jan. 1788);
Freehling, supra note 101, at 91.
106. On July 26, 1787, the Philadelphia Convention gave the Committee
.of Detail twenty-three resolutions, including the slave trade provision. The
five members of the Committee were Oliver Elseworth of Connecticut,
Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts, Edmund Randolph of Virginia, John
Rutledge of South Carolina, and James Wilson of Pennsylvania. 2 M.
FARRAND, supra note 34, at 116-28.
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his State to vote against their Report."' 7 The position of the
Deep South apparently stirred the Committee, which returned
with a special clause for the region: "No tax or duty shall be
laid by the legislature on articles exported from any state; nor
on the migration or importation of such persons as the several
states shall think proper to admit; nor shall such migration or
importation be prohibited."' 8 The provision left the slave trade
with the states.'0 9 The national government could not regulate
the traffic either directly, by establishing anti-slave trade laws,
or indirectly, by establishing navigation acts. "0 The provision,
therefore, would benefit primarily the Deep South. The major-
ity of the other states, because their economies and social struc-
tures no longer depended on the institution, had either
emancipated their slaves or had begun the process."' Mary-
land and Virginia, on the other hand, had slave surpluses." 2
On August 21, 1787, the slave traffic debate began with
Luther Martin of Maryland opening the discussion. By recom-
mending that the trade be either prohibited or at least taxed,
he clearly stated the anti-inclusion viewpoint.' ' He supported
his motion with a three-pronged argument. First, the three-
fifths clause concerning representation would encourage the
slave traffic." 4 Second, because slavery weakened the entire
nation, it was a national matter, not a local issue as the South-
107. Id. at 95 (23 July 1787).
108. Id. at 168-69 (emphasis added). W. PETERS, A MORE PERFECT UNION
164 (1987). For a discussion of the views the pro- and anti-slavery groups
held toward the interpretation of the terms migration and importation within the
clause, see W. WIECEK, supra note 37, at 75. See also 4J. ELLIOT, supra note 35,
at 102 (J. Iredell, 26July 1788).
109. Unable to abolish slavery, the Philadelphia Convention dealt with
whether the state or federal governments would control the institution. C.
BOWEN, supra note 93, at 201.
110. C. MEE, supra note 78, at 240.
111. See infra notes 160, 238. In 1780, Massachusetts abolished slavery;
Pennsylvania passed a post-nati gradual abolition statute in 1780; Connecticut
and Rhode Island passed post-nati gradual abolition statutes in 1784; New
York, in 1785, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Virginia, in 1786, passed
manumission acts; before the framing, slavery had disappeared in New
Hampshire by inanition; South Carolina had halted the international slave
trade prior to the framing; Maryland and Delaware also had laws to halt the
traffic; only Georgia lacked a law to prohibit the international slave trade. See
W. DuBois, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE TO THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 1638-1870, at 201-88 (1896), for a summary of the anti-
slavery laws.
112. See infra notes 154, 156, 158 and accompanying text.
113. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 364 (21 Aug. 1787).
114. Id. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text, for a response to
Luther Martin's first point.
ANOTHER LOOK
ern delegates claimed." 5 For example, national troops would
have to be used to suppress slave insurrections." 16 Third, the
clause "was inconsistent with the principles of the revolution
and dishonorable to the American character.... "17
John Rutledge of South Carolina responded to each of
Martin's points. First, he did not understand how the federal
ratio would encourage the importation of slaves." 8 Second, he
was not concerned about insurrections and would not require
the national troops to protect the Southern states from
them." 9 And, third, he posited that
religion and humanity had nothing to do with this ques-
tion. Interest alone is the governing principle with
Nations. The true question at present is whether the
Southern States shall or shall not be parties to the Union.
If the Northern States consult their interest, they will not
oppose the increase of Slaves which will increase the
commodities of which they will become the carriers.' 20
Rutledge made the Deep South's position clear: without the
protection of slavery, the region would not enter the union. In
addition, the morality of the institution was not subject to
debate, because it was a matter for each state to address.
Rutledge was raising the traditional states' rights argu-
ment, which holds that each state has the right to regulate its
internal affairs.' 2 ' Protecting state sovereignty was important
115. See supra note 113.
116. Id.
117. Id. Luther Martin was correct. Unfortunately, the nation, at the
framing, had not yet been able to put those principles into practice. See infra
notes 235-39, 250-55 and accompanying text. On the paradox of the
existence of the institution of slavery in a nation dedicated to freedom, see E.
MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM (1975).
118. See supra note 113.
119. Id.
120. Id. The Deep South based its pro-slavery position on the premise
that "[i]nterest alone is the governing principle with Nations." Id. The falsity
of the claim is what caused the Deep South's position to flounder.
121. General William Heath, an anti-slavery delegate from Massachusetts,
said at his state's ratifying convention:
I apprehend that it is not in our power to do any thing for or against
those who are in slavery in the southern States. . . . Each State is
sovereign and independent to a certain degree, and they have a
right, and will regulate their own internal affairs, as to themselves
appears proper .... [W]e have no right to compell [sic] them.
2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 115 (30 Jan. 1788). For discussions on the
states' rights debate at the time of the Constitution's drafting, see R. BERGER,
FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987); A. MASON, THE STATES RIGHTS
DEBATE (A. Mason 2d ed. 1972); W. MURPHY, THE TRIUMPH OF NATIONALISM
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to the framers. Even in 1776, no one in the Continental Con-
gress, save for Dr. Samuel Hopkins, suggested that the national
government could abolish or control slavery in the states. 2 '
For the Deep South, a powerful national government was per-
missible so long as it did not meddle with slavery.' 2 ' Slavery
was a local matter.' 2 4 The framers and those who ratified the
Constitution did not think they were treating slavery any differ-
ently from other issues outside the federal government's con-
trol. ' 5 The national consensus at the time forbade the
Congress from interfering with many institutions and features
of American life. 126 The Deep South, then, was not unique in
demanding local control over local institutions. 27 As such,
"[n]o conclusion-no constitutional clause, no public policy or
pronouncement-that failed to take this minor premise fully
into account could ever be acceptable to the South."' 28
Oliver Elseworth of Connecticut agreed with Rutledge.' 29
He favored importation. 3 ° "The morality or wisdom of slav-
ery," he stated, "are considerations belonging to the States
themselves. What enriches a part enriches the whole, and the
States are the best judges of their particular interest."''3 He
continued by remarking that the government under the Articles
of Confederation "had not meddled with this point, and he did
not see any greater necessity for bringing it within the policy of
the new one."' 32 Indeed, living under the Articles had condi-
tioned the views of many framers toward the ability of a gov-
ernment to control slavery.
(1967); see also 3 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND LEGAL HISTORY (K. Hall
ed. 1987); M. ZUCKERT, A System Without Precedent: Federalism in the American
Constitution, in THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 132 (L.
Levy & D. Mahoney eds. 1987).
122. W. WIECEK, supra note 37, at 57. Samuel Hopkins, a theologian,
implored the Continental Congress to end slavery. S. HOPKINS, A Dialogue
Concerning the Slavery of the Africans, Showing it to be the Duty and Interest of the
American Colonies to Emancipate all the African Slaves, with an Address to the Owners
of such Slaves, in TIMELY ARTICLES ON SLAVERY 547 (1969).
123. D. ROBINSON, supra note.52, at 210.
124. Abraham Baldwin, a Georgia delegate, said: "Georgia was decided
on this point." 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 372 (22 Aug. 1787).
125. D. ROBINSON, supra note 52, at 246.
126. Id.
127. THE FEDERALIST No. 36 (A. Hamilton).
128. D. ROBINSON, supra note 52, at 210.





Elseworth's speech reflected the hesitance that he and
other delegates had about creating a government with strong,
central control. 3' They were unsure about giving up what
they knew-however faulty-for something untried.13 4  In
short, they wanted slow and steady change.' 35 Nevertheless,
even if the Congress could regulate slavery, finding a delegate
who could suggest how the new government would grant "the
slaves both the substance and fact of freedom" would have
been difficult, if not impossible.'3 6 No doubt, finding a dele-
gate who could suggest the structure of a society in which free
whites and free blacks coexisted peacefully would have been
even harder. 37 The framers, therefore, were unwilling to alter
radically the social structure of the states. They thought such
an achievement would have caused the sweeping alteration of
American society, especially in the Deep South. The change
would have been more tumultuous than the Revolutionary
War:13 8 the entire fabric of American society would have to
have been ripped apart and then resown. Owing to the eco-
nomic, political, and social instability of the states, the framers
133. The framers were suspicious about what they were creating. As
historian David Robinson observed:
Men were being asked to commit their lives and destinies to an
unknown and untried system of institutions the specifications for
which were necessarily sketchy and incomplete. Who could know
how the powers committed to the federal government would be
used? Who could know what elements would control the
administration? Who could confidently anticipate the balance of
forces in the legislature, or what the dominant elements would try to
do with their power? The ratification of the Constitution would be a
gamble for everyone.
D. ROBINSON, supra note 52, at 235.
Moreover, suspicion existed among the delegates from the different
regions. Pierce Butler of South Carolina was concerned that the North might
use representation to force emancipation. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at
594 (12 July 1787). In return, Rufus King from Massachusetts thought the
South would use its potential majority in the Congress to oppress commerce.
Id. at 595-96 (12July 1787). See also id. at 604 (G. Morris, 13July 1787); 2 id.
at 9-10 (J. Madison, 14 July 1787).
134. See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 133 and accompanying text; see infra notes 213, 284,
299-308 and accompanying text. In regard to the institution of slavery, the
framers wanted the gradual replacement of slaves with free white and free
black labor. M. MELLON, supra note 97, at 167.
136. C. ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 269 (1966).
137. Id. See infra note 251.
138. C. ROSSITER, supra note 136, at 31-32. Historian Clinton Rossiter
rightly emphasized that the founding fathers were not "audacious heralds of
a social revolution." They were, instead, "prudent builders of a nation." Id.
at 268.
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concluded that the states were neither willing nor able to with-
stand such a drastic change.' 9 The framers correctly reasoned
that the time was not ripe to dissolve the system of slavery;14
but the Constitution could be modified should the proper
mood ever surface. 141
Roger Sherman of Connecticut advocated the gradualist
approach.142 He said that because the states were already
allowed to import slaves and because "the public good did not
require" the trade's termination, "he thought it best to leave
the matter" alone."' His chief concern was gaining the least
number of objections to the new plan of government to ensure
its acceptance. 144 He continued by emphasizing "that the abo-
lition of slavery seemed to be going on in the United States and
that the good sense of the several States would probably by
degrees compleat [sic] it.' 1 45 The Deep South supported Sher-
man's last point.' 46 Abraham Baldwin of Georgia, for instance,
said that if his state was left alone on the matter, it would likely
end the trade.' 47 For the time being, however, both Georgia
and South Carolina needed the trade to resupply their fields
with slaves. 148
Perhaps the most emotionally laden speech against the
institution came from George Mason of Virginia. Slavery, he
contended, was not a local matter, but a national issue.149 Fur-
ther, he countered the Deep South's assertion that slavery
would disappear, by highlighting the requests of the people in
the western territories for slaves to work their lands.' 50 Mason
worried that slavery would harm the new nation, because it
"prevent[ed] the immigration of Whites, who really enrich and
strengthen a Country."' 5'' Equally important, he said that
"[e]very master of slaves is born a petty tyrant. They bring the
139. See infra notes 239, 283-87.
140. See infra notes 251-55, 265-66, 284-87 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 293-308 and accompanying text.
142. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 369 (22 Aug. 1787).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 369-70.
146. In addition, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina said: "If the
Southern States were let alone they will probably of themselves stop
importation." Id. at 371 (22 Aug. 1787).
147. Id. at 372 (22 Aug. 1787).
148. 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 100 (R. Spaight, 26 July 1788). The
Deep South had lost a significant number of slaves during the Revolutionary
War. Id. at 101, 178 (J. Iredell, 26, 29 July 1787).




judgment of heaven on a Country.... By an inevitable chain of
causes and effects providence punishes national sins, by
national calamities."15 2
Mason's words were ironic. Even though he argued the
most forcefully against slavery, he was the largest slaveholder
among the delegates: he owned more than two hundred slaves
on his Virginia plantation.15 3 In his favor, he appeared to have
been caught in the conflict of questioning the morality of a sys-
tem he grew up accepting as a good, but which he was not yet
ready to discard. Notwithstanding his moral confusion, Mason
had obvious political and economic reasons for condemning
the trade. Virginia, along with Maryland, had a slave sur-
plus. 154 Importation would not have benefited them as it
would have South Carolina or Georgia. 55 In fact, Virginia and
Maryland would have gained financially from the ban; their
slaves would have received a higher price in interstate
trading. 156
Elseworth responded to Mason.' 57 Besides mentioning
Mason's hidden economic motives, Elseworth attacked the
accuracy of Mason's prediction that slavery would continue.
158
Elseworth echoed the Deep South's argument that the need for
slaves would be short-lived: "Slavery in time will not be a
speck in our Country."' 159 Consequently, the slave trade
should be allowed to help the economy of the Deep South.' 6 °
152. Id.
153. C. BOWEN, supra note 93, at 202.
154. See infra notes 156, 158. Virginia's slave surplus and declining
economy gave the state and, in particular, James Mason an economic reason
to urge the end of the international slave traffic. W. DuBois, supra note 111,
at 15.
155. As a result of the Revolutionary War, both states were in dire need of
slaves. 4J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 101, 178 (J. Iredell, 26, 29 July 1787).
156. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 371 (Gen. Pinckney, 22 Aug. 1787).
157. Id. at 370-71 (22 Aug. 1787).
158. Id. at 371.
159. Id.
160. See infra note 162. The economy of the slave states, which were
predominately rural and agricultural, was labor intensive. The cultivation of
labor intensive crops, such as tobacco and rice, caused a reliance on slavery.
The economy depended on slaves because they were both capital and labor
for slaveowners, that is, the slaveowners used their profits to buy additional
slaves. As a result, the Southern economy grew, but did not develop
commercial or industrial forms of production as did the North. It just grew
more dependent on slavery. J. MCPHERSON, supra note 37, at 23-27. On the
economics of slavery and its relationship to Southern economic development,
see DID SLAVERY PAY? (H. Aitken ed. 1971); E. GENOVESE, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF SLAVERY (1965); SLAVERY AND THE SOUTHERN ECONOMY (H.
Woodman ed. 1966); THE STRUCTURE OF THE COTTON ECONOMY OF THE
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Once the region substituted another effective form of labor, it
would abolish the traffic.' 6 I  By prohibiting the traffic,
Elseworth thought the delegates would be "unjust" toward
South Carolina and Georgia.' 62
Clearly, the founders were more concerned with creating a
nation than with destroying an institution they thought was
more economically essential than morally distasteful. 63 The
Deep South's proposal seemed reasonable to the delegates: if
they let the region import slaves, it would join the union and
perhaps abolish slavery in the future. 164 Furthermore, many
delegates thought slavery would be isolated to the Deep South
and would eventually disappear.' 65 The Northwest Ordinance,
which outlawed slavery in the Northwest Territories, had been
passed 16 6 and many states had either already outlawed slavery
or had begun to do so because their economies and social
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (W. Parker ed. 1970); G. WRIGHT, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE COTTON SOUTH (1978); Anderson & Gallman, Slaves as Fixed
Capital. Slave Labor and Southern Economic Development, 44 J. AM. HIST. 24
(1977); Conrad, Dowd, Engerman, Ginzberg, Kelso, Meyer, Scheiber, &
Sutch, Slavery as an Obstacle to Economic Growth in the United States: A Panel
Discussion, 27J. ECON. HIST. 518 (1967).
Unlike the economy of the slave states, the Northern economy did not
depend on slavery. Its economy consisted of freehold farming, trade, and
local manufacturing. Its agricultural economy was capital intensive, that is,
Northern farmers invested their profits in machinery. Thus, the effectiveness
of and need for slaves diminished with the increase of faster and more
efficient machinery. J. MCPHERSON, supra, at 23-27. See S. BRUCHEY, THE
ROOTS OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWrH 1607-1865 (1965), for a fuller
discussion of the Northern economy.
161. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 371 (22 Aug. 1787).
162. Id.
163. Hugh Williamson of North Carolina "thought the Southern States
could not be members of the Union if the [slave trade] clause should be
rejected, and that it was wrong to force anything down, not absolutely
necessary, and which any State must disagree to." Id. at 373 (22 Aug. 1787).
164. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 145, 159 and accompanying text; see also infra notes
210-17, 313-14 and accompanying text.
166. The Continental Congress adopted the Northwest Ordinance on July
13, 1787. Regarding slavery, the Ordinance read: "There shall be neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in the
punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." 2
F. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 962 (1909).
Because of the political and emotional circumstances of 1787, "it would
have been impossible, and therefore both fatuous and suicidal, for the
Convention to have attempted to outlaw or even control slavery" in the
original states. C. RoSSITER, supra note 136, at 269. Those same
circumstances, however, made it plausible for the Congress to exclude
slavery from the Northwest Territory. Id. Moreover, as William Freehling
stated, the founding fathers "helped protect slavery where it was explosive
ANOTHER LOOK
structures no longer required slaves.' 6 7 The Deep South,
moreover, was not imposing its needs on the other states.' 68 It
was not forcing them to import slaves; rather, the Deep South
was just requesting that the other states tolerate its need for the
system. 169
By voicing the Deep South's conviction that slavery was
warranted, Charles Pinckney seconded Elseworth's speech.' 7
0
"If slavery be wrong," he declared, "it is justified by the exam-
ple of all the world. In all ages one half of mankind have been
slaves."' 17 1 Pinckney was reinforcing the position of the Deep
South that the morality of slavery was not debatable; it was a
matter for each state to address by itself. He finished by argu-
ing that any erosion of the region's right to own slaves would
"produce serious objections to the Constitution. ...""'2 Simi-
larly, General Charles Pinckney warned the Convention that
even if the South Carolina delegation signed the Constitution,
the state would never ratify it absent slavery protections. 17 To
emphasize his statement, he underscored the economic impor-
tance the institution had for the Deep South: "South Carolina
and Georgia cannot do without slaves."' 174
In spite of the criticism of Mason's speech, Mason rallied a
few Northern delegates to oppose the provision. 175 Stated sim-
ply, they did not want the document to sanction slavery. 176
and helped demolish it where it was manageable." Freehling, supra note 101,
at 93.
167. See supra notes 111, 160 and accompanying text; see also infra note 238
and accompanying text.
168. During the Massachusetts ratifying convention, Thomas Dawes said:
"Besides, by the new Constitution, every particular state is left to its own
option totally to prohibit the introduction of slaves into its own territories."
2J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 40 (18 Jan. 1788).
169. General William Heath said, during the Massachusetts ratifying
convention: "We are not, in this case, partakers of other men's sins; for in
nothing do we voluntarily encourage the slavery of our fellow men." Id. at
115 (30Jan. 1788).
170. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 371 (22 Aug. 1787).
171. Id. Charles Pinckney's statement was the only moral defense of
slavery made at the Philadelphia Convention.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. Rawlins Lowndes said in the South Carolina ratifying convention:
"Negroes were our wealth, our only natural resource. 4 J. ELLIOT, supra
note 35, at 273 (16Jan. 1788).
175. John Dickinson of Delaware, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, and
John Langdon of New Hampshire spoke out against the provision. 2 M.
FARRAND, supra note 34, at 372-73 (22 Aug. 1787).
176. John Dickinson "considered it as inadmissible on every principle of
honor and safety that the import of slaves should be authorized to the States
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Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts offered the sternest retort
to the Deep South's position. He "did not see the propriety"
of compromising on the matter. 177  The Eastern states, he
observed, "did not need the aid of the South[ ] ..
Gorham meant that the Eastern states were able to protect
themselves from outside attackers, whereas the South was
not. 179 Gorham's speech alarmed Elseworth, who along with
Roger Sherman of Connecticut and Edmund Randolph of Vir-
ginia, strove for compromise between the pro- and anti-inclu-
sion delegates.'8 ° Elseworth was concerned that the debates
on the trade would disrupt the compromise on the apportion-
ment provision as well as possibly dissolve the Convention.' 8 '
He argued that "[i]f we do not agree on this middle and mod-
erate ground ... we should lose two States," which might lead
the other states to splinter "into several confederations and not
without bloodshed."18 2
Tension was apparent at the Convention. Neither the pro-
inclusion nor the anti-inclusion sides seemed willing to acqui-
esce. Gouverneur Morris' 83 of Pennsylvania, realizing the
by the Constitution." Id. at 372 (22 Aug. 1787). Elbridge Gerry said: "[W]e
ought to be careful not to give any sanction to [slavery]." Id. (22 Aug. 1787).
Gerry conceded the states' rights argument, however. He thought the
Convention "had nothing to do with the conduct of the states as to
slaves .. " Id.
177. Id. at 374 (22 Aug. 1787).
178. Id.
179. Id. See also supra note 74.
180. On the issue of the slave trade, Roger Sherman said: "[I]t was better
to let the Southern States import slaves than to part with them .... 2 M.
FARRAND, supra note 34, at 374 (22 Aug. 1787). Edmund Randolph "was for
committing in order that some middle ground might, if possible, be found...
[so that] two States might [not] be lost to the Union. Id. (22 Aug. 1787). See
also W. WIECEK, supra note 37, at 73.
181. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 375 (22 Aug. 1787); W. WIECEK,
supra note 37, at 73.
182. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 375 (22 Aug. 1787); W. WIECEK,
supra note 37, at 73. See infra notes 271-80 and accompanying text, for a
discussion of the potential confederations that would have been established
had the Philadelphia Convention folded.
183. Justice Marshall singled out Gouverneur Morris as one of the framers
who committed a "moral compromise." Marshall, infra, at app. 127.
Marshall seemed shocked that Morris could oppose slavery, later accept it,
and even write the final draft of the document that tolerated it. Id. Morris
said at the Convention that "[h]e never would concur in upholding domestic
slavery. It was a nefarious institution-It was the curse of heaven on the
States where it prevailed." 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 221 (8 Aug.
1787). Even though he opposed slavery, Morris offered the compromise that
united the slave and non-slave states and, thereby, helped create the nation.
For the full text of Morris's famous anti-slavery speech, see id. at 221-23.
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potential harm the deadlock would cause, offered a compro-
mise.184 His tool was the navigation acts clause. 185 Navigation
acts require all commodities to be shipped in vessels belonging
to a particular nation. 186 For the maritime states, the acts could
bring a large profit.' 87 The Southern states, however, disliked
navigation acts.' 8 8 They feared that the North, which con-
trolled shipping and would also control the Congress, would
pass acts requiring all American products to be shipped solely
in American vessels.' 89 The Southern states, as the primary
producers of commodities to be shipped, would be economi-
cally harmed by such a regulation, because the Northern ship-
pers could charge whatever they wanted.' 90 In other words,
Northern shipping and commerce would be benefited at the
expense of the South. Because of the potential abuse, the
Committee of Detail included a two-thirds requirement to
make it highly unlikely for the Congress to pass navigation acts
without Southern approval. 19
Morris understood that the Northern shipping states
wanted the two-thirds provision excluded and that the Deep
South wanted the slave trade provision included.' 92 Hence, he
suggested that the Convention create a committee to evaluate
both provisions."' Morris hoped "these things [might] form a
bargain among the Northern and Southern States." 114 The
Convention concurred.' 9 5 In less than one day, the Committee
of Eleven came to terms, and on August 24 it presented the
184. W. PETERS, supra note 108, at 168-69.
185. The Navigation Acts clause required that "[n]o navigation act shall
be passed without the assent of two thirds of the members present in each
house." 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 209-12. W. PETERS, supra note 108,
at 145.
186. Navigation Acts include tariffs, quotas, and embargoes.





192. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 366 (22 Aug. 1787).
193. Besides questions of navigation acts and slave importation, the
committee the Convention established-the Committee of Eleven-
considered issues of export taxes and capitation. Id.
194. Id. at 374.
195. The members of the Committee of Eleven were Abraham Baldwin,
Georgia; George Clymer, Pennsylvania; John Dickinson, Delaware; William
Samuel Johnson, Connecticut; Rufus King, Massachusetts; John Langdon,
New Hampshire; William Livingston, New Jersey; James Madison, Virginia;
Luther Martin, Maryland; Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, South Carolina; and
Hugh Williamson, North Carolina. Id. at 366.
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agreement to the Convention: the two-thirds provision would
be replaced by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress, and
the slave trade would be permitted to continue until 1800.196
"But a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation not
exceeding ten dollars for each person."' 97 The 1800 deadline
was later extended to 1808, to allow the continuation of the
trade for twenty years after the ratification of the Constitu-
tion.' 98 With little debate, the Convention voted in favor of the
Committee's agreement. 99 The slave states were satisfied,
because the trade would continue;200 the non-slave states were
satisfied, because the trade would be terminated in twenty
years and slaves would be taxed.20
In the state ratifying conventions, the slave traffic provi-
sion was offered to the delegates to allay their insecurities
about entering the new nation. In the Deep South, the clause
was presented as a guarantee of its property. Robert Barnwell
of South Carolina assured his state's convention that the trade
would never end.202 "To think so," he stated, "is . . . contra-
dictory to the general conduct of mankind ... .- 20 If South
196. Id. at 396. According to Frederick Douglass, most thinkers of 1787
"looked upon the slave trade as the life of slavery." 2 LIFE AND WRITINGS,
supra note 1, at 473. These individuals concluded that the end of the trade
would cause "the certain death of slavery." Id. As such, "American
statesmen, in providing for the abolition of the slave trade, thought they were
providing for the abolition of slavery." Id.
197. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 400.
198. Id. at 408.
199. The framers agreed on the following draft of the slave trade clause:
The migration or importation of such persons as the several states
now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by
the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and
eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not
exceeding ten dollars for each person.
Id. at 596. For arguments regarding the different ways the Congress could
have handled the slave trade, see W. WIECEK, supra note 37, at 81-83.
200. See infra notes 202-08 and accompanying text.
201. See infra notes 209-17 and accompanying text. After permitting the
slave trade to continue, the delegates accepted the fugitive slave provision
without argument. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 443, 446, 453 (28, 29
Aug. 1787). The provision read: "No person held to service or labor in one
State under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of
any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but
shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may
be." Id. at 662. See, for scholarship on the Fugitive Slave Law, S. CAMPBELL,
THE SLAVE CATCHERS (1970); R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975); P.
FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION (1980); Wiecek, Slavery and Abolition Before
the United States Supreme Court, 1820-1860, 65J. AM. HIST. 34 (1978).
202. 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 296 (17 Jan. 1788).
203. Id. at 296-97.
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Carolina did not abolish the trade, he argued, it would con-
tinue forever.20 4 Barnwell reasoned that the Eastern states
needed the produce of slaves for their carrier trade.20 5 As a
result, the maritime states would encourage the trade for their
advancement.20 6 Charles Cotesworth Pinckney instructed the
South Carolina delegation that "[b]y this settlement we have
secured an unlimited importation of negroes for twenty
years.... [W]e have a security that the general government can
never emancipate them, for no such authority is
granted .... " 2 0 7 He concluded by saying that "considering all
circumstances, we have made the best terms, for the security of
this species of property, it was in our power to make. We
would have made better if we could, but on the whole I do not
think them bad." 20 8
The delegates in the other conventions used a different
approach to gain approval for the provision. In those states,
the clause was presented as an end to slavery.20 9 James Wilson
remarked to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention that slavery
would be confined to the Deep South.210  Referring to the
Northwest Ordinance, Wilson assured the convention that the
204. Id.
205. Id. at 296.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 286 (17 Jan. 1788).
208. Id.
209. George Mason maintained his anti-slavery position even during the
Virginia ratifying convention. He said that
by this Constitution, [the slave trade] is continued for twenty years.
As much as I value a union of all the States, I would not admit the
Southern States into the Union unless they agree to the
discontinuance of this disgraceful trade, because it would bring
weakness and not strength, to the Union.
3 id. at 452 (15 June 1788). Mason's position was in the minority. Further-
more, his stance was unreasonable, because if implemented, it would have
probably brought about great disturbance: the nation would not have been
formed and slavery would have probably had a firmer foundation under other
governmental schemes. See also infra notes 267-74 and accompanying text.
Luther Martin of Maryland commented to his state ratifying convention
that the trade and three-fifths clauses "ought to be considered as a solemn
mockery of, and insult to that God whose protection we had then implored,
and consider not fail to hold us up in detestation, and render us contemptible
to every true friend of liberty in the world." 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at
211 (29 Nov. 1787). Martin's statement is interesting because he had wanted
the federal government to conduct a gradual emancipation program. His
opposition to the Constitution seemed to contradict that position.
210. 2J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 452 (3 Dec. 1787).
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Congress had prohibited its spread into the new states.2 ' Fur-
thermore, Wilson interpreted the clause "as laying the founda-
tion for banishing slavery out of this country. "212 He also
predicted it would result in the same "gradual change, which
was pursued in Pennsylvania. '"21' In the Massachusetts ratify-
ing convention, the Reverend Backus noted that the Articles of
Confederation did not prohibit importation;2 14 "but a door is
now opened hereafter to do it, and each state is at liberty now
to abolish slavery as soon as they please."-2 15 On the same mat-
ter, James Iredell remarked to the North Carolina ratifying con-
vention: "[S]urely ... we gain by it." '216 The United States, he
declared, would be the first nation to restrict the trade and
would, therefore, "set an example of humanity by providing for
the abolition of this inhuman traffic, though at a distant
period. 2 1 7
The delegates who ratified the Constitution obviously
interpreted the document's handling of slavery differently. In
the Deep South, the delegates thought it heightened the secur-
ity of the institution. The delegates of the other states thought
it successfully weakened slavery. Regardless of their interpre-
tations, both sides joined the new nation secure that their inter-
211. Id. For more on the Northwest Ordinance, see P. ONUF, STATEHOOD
AND UNION (1987).
212. 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 452 (3 Dec. 1787). Thomas Dawes said
in the Massachusetts ratifying convention that, as a result of the slave trade
provision, slavery "has received a mortal wound and will die of
consumption." Id. at 41 (18 Jan. 1788).
213. Id. at 452.
214. Id. at 149 (2 Feb. 1788). The Articles of Confederation made no
reference to slavery.
215. Id. In the Massachusetts ratifying convention, gentlemen responded
to those who doubted that the Congress could end the slave trade by saying
that
the step taken in this article, towards the abolition of slavery, was
one of the beauties of the Constitution. They observed, that in the
confederation there was no provision whatever for its ever being
abolished; but this Constitution provides, that Congress may, after
twenty years, totally annihilate the slave trade; and that, as all the
States, except two, have passed laws to this effect, it might reasonably
be expected, that it would then be done. In the interim, all the States
were at liberty to prohibit it.
W. PHILLIPS, THE CONSTITUTION: A PRO-SLAVERY COMPACT 40-41 (1844)
(emphasis added).
216. 4J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 101 (26 July 1788).
217. Id. James Madison thought the slave traffic provision was a "great
point gained in favour of humanity .... THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 213 (J.
Madison) (M. Beloff 2d ed. 1987).
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ests would be protected.2 18 As one historian has observed,
"most Southerners and Northerners entered into government
under the Constitution convinced that they were better off than
they had been under the Articles, with regard to slavery as well
as most other things."'219
Even though the framers compromised on slavery, their
compromise was not immoral. As Part III will illustrate, the
delegates made a morally defensible decision by tolerating the
institution.
III. Is THE CONSTITUTION A DOCUMENT OF MORAL
COMPROMISE?
Slavery and racism are morally indefensible.220 Their moral sta-
tus is independent of both the time and place under considera-
tion. The wrongness of slavery flows from the relationship it
establishes between one human being and another; its wrong-
ness does not stem from where or when the parties to the rela-
tionship lived. In the same vein, racism is wrong, because it
involves basing judgments of moral worth on such non-moral
traits as skin color. Indeed, both slavery and racism are always
and everywhere wrong. To think otherwise would be an
endorsement of moral relativism. Moral relativism makes
morality wholly arbitrary and subjective, because it makes non-
moral factors, for example, the century and region in which
one lives, somehow determinative of the morality of one's con-
duct. 22 1 Furthermore, moral relativism denies the existence of
one universal moral law or standard.222 Morality, on this
account, is not absolute, but relative to the age, place, and cir-
cumstances in which it is found. 22' Thus, an action that is
proper in one society and time period may be improper in
218. The framers "were satisfied that they had disposed of the issue of
slavery to the satisfaction of everyone. Everyone, it seems, judged the
Constitution in light of the Articles of Confederation, and nearly everyone
found it superior." D. ROBINSON, supra note 52, at 243.
219. Id. at 244. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 453 U. Madison, 15 June
1788).
220. For a discussion of slavery, racism, and prejudice, see J. MELLON,
BULLWHIP DAYS (1989); G. NASH, RED, WHITE, AND BLACK 162 (1974);
Handlin, The Origins of the Southern Labor System, 7 WM. & MARY Q 199 (1950);
Ruchames, The Sources of Racial Thought in Colonial America, 52 J. NEGRO HIST.
268 (1967). See also PONTIFICAL COMMISSION FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE, The
Church and Racism: Toward a More Fraternal Society (Vatican Doc., Feb. 10,
1989).
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another, because morality is determined by the commonly
accepted practices of a person or of a people.224 Because the
Deep South permitted slavery and racism, a relativist would
conclude that both were morally proper. Such an argument,
however, is fallacious and repugnant. Slavery and racism are
neither time- nor place-dependent wrongs.2 2 5
In his speech, Justice Marshall correctly noted the immo-
rality of slavery, the moral indifference of many framers, and
the achievement of the fourteenth amendment.2 26 As a matter
of constitutional law, the fourteenth amendment clearly worked
a radical change in the relationship between the federal gov-
ernment and the states. 227 Subsequent to the inclusion of the
amendment, the federal government acquired an expanded
224. Id. at 9. A moral relativist does not believe that universal moral
standards exist. To a relativist, the word standard refers to local, ephemeral,
and variable sets of moral ideas. In contrast, a moral absolutist interprets the
word standard in two ways. The absolutist considers local, ephemeral, and
variable sets of moral ideas, but compares them to a single universal moral
standard. Therefore, for the local, ephemeral, and variable sets of moral
ideas to be morally proper, they must align with the absolute and unchanging
universal principle. For the moral relativist, however, the two-stage process
of analysis is unnecessary to define good moral conduct: whatever the local
people think is moral, is moral. Id. at 10-12.
225. Moral relativism is harmful, because its acceptance and
implementation will destroy the concept of morality. If morality is defined by
commonly accepted practices, the nobler aspirations and qualities of man will
disappear. This assertion is not as alarmist as it seems. Because moral
relativism discards the belief in moral absolutes, comparisons between
different moral standards is also discarded. Without moral valuations, people
become the sole judges of their own morality. With the collapse of all
effective standards, moral chaos will follow. If each person's sense of
morality becomes as good as another's-no matter how different-practical
conduct will be destroyed. If one person's moral standard is no better than
someone else's, a person has no reason to recommend his morality or follow
it. That person will, therefore, probably slip into lower and easier standards,
which will be defended as morally sound solely because that person believes
them to be. Id. at 45-46, 48, 52-53. See Encyclical Letter of His Holiness
Pope Leo XIII, Libertas (On the Nature of Human Liberty) (June 20, 1888),
reprinted in 2 THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 169 (C. Carlen ed. 1981), for a
discussion on how universal corruption results when God and the existence
of natural law and natural rights are set aside and human reason is used as
the only authority by which to determine right from wrong. For more
information on moral relativism, see also P. FOOT, MORAL RELATIVISM (1979);
Harman, Moral Relativism Defended, PHIL. REV. (1975); Wiggins, Truth,
Invention, and the Meaning of Life, PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY
(1976); Williams, The Truth in Relativism, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN
Soc'y (1974-75).
226. Marshall, infra, at app. 126-29.
227. Many books and articles have been written about the fourteenth
amendment; see, e.g., R. CORTNER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE SECOND BILL
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superintendency over the methods the several states used to
govern their citizens. The federal government's broader
power-a prerogative that specific provisions of articles I and
IV of the Constitution228 had narrowly confined-was, by the
fourteenth amendment, given an open-endedness that has
been the focal point of constitutional debate for the past one
hundred years. The fourteenth amendment acknowledges that
a just government-one that is fair to all people and respectful
of everyone's rights-is a condition of a morally legitimate gov-
ernment, which is a gain for the American political culture. Put
another way, the amendment precludes any value in leaving the
states free to deny fairness or the protection of rights to some
of its citizens. As Marshall argued, the constraint the four-
teenth amendment has put on state sovereignty is, therefore,
both substantial and, to an extent, defensible. 29
Despite the merits of Marshall's speech, he wrongly con-
demned the actions of the framers. Because Marshall analyzed
the federal convention from a late twentieth-century perspec-
tive, he treated the framers' work unfairly. He should have
given the period in which the delegates were living and labor-
ing more thoughtful consideration. 2 "0  Had he done so, he
would have realized that before the mid-eighteenth century,
few white men debated the morality of black slavery.23' Conse-
OF RIGHTS (1981); J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
(1956).
228. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text, for a list of the relevant
provisions in articles I and IV.
229. See R. BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 158-63 (1987),
for a brief discourse on the fourteenth amendment. Berger correctly noted
that the amendment was not intended by its framers to strip the states of their
right to regulate their internal affairs, even though the United States
Supreme Court has interpreted the amendment in that way. See, e.g., Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
For a more detailed account of the limited objections held by the framers of
the fourteenth amendment, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 193-220 (1977). Berger
argues that the social change the fourteenth amendment brought about was
caused by federal judges who used the amendment as a vehicle to reconstruct
federal/state relations.
230. In his speech, Justice Marshall disregarded the argument "that the
Constitution was a product of its times," as a justification for its defects.
Marshall, infra, at app. 127-28. He gave no reasons, however.
231. Even though slavery was used throughout the Western Hemisphere,
the morality of the subject was rarely debated by white men before the mid-
eighteenth century. J. MCPHERSON, supra note 37, at 38. Yet, by the middle
of the century, three currents of Anglo-American and French thought
addressed the immorality of the institution. Id.
The first of these oppositions to slavery came from the religious sector.
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quently, at the framing, no national passion against and no
compelling moral objection to the institution existed.23 2 As
John Jay wrote in 1788, "the great majority" of people in both
the North and the South accepted slavery, and "very few
among them even doubted the propriety and rectitude of
it. '"233 Some people, of course, had begun to question the
morality of the institution by the time of the framing, but their
influence was infinitesimal on the populace. 34
In 1688 the Germantown Mennonites declared in Philadelphia that slavery
was inconsistent with Christian principles. Id. W. BENNETT & T. EASTLAND,
COUNTING BY RACE 28 (1979). Another religious group, which became more
effective than the Mennonites in its anti-slavery crusade, was the Quakers. By
1760 they had freed their slaves and in 1775 had established the Pennsylvania
Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery-the first anti-slavery
organization in America. The Quakers emphasized that slavery was not a
necessary subordination to authority in order to preserve the social order.
Instead, it was a sin. W. BENNETT & T. EASTLAND, supra, at 28; J. MCPHERSON,
supra, at 38.
The second development was the intellectual advancements of the
Enlightenment. These advancements challenged the intellectual
rationalization of slavery by questioning the place bondage had in a society
that strove to provide the greatest happiness for the greatest number. J.
MCPHERSON, supra, at 38. Moreover, the belief in the inherent goodness and
dignity of man exposed during the Enlightenment further challenged the
theory behind slavery. Id. K. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION 19 (1956).
The third force was the emergence of laissez-faire economics, which
discarded feudalism and mercantilism. According to this economic theory,
slavery was counterproductive to the economy, because it restricted free
enterprise and free labor. These objections were outlined by Adam Smith in
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776). Smith wrote
that "the experience of all ages and nations" proved that slave labor "though
it appears to cost only their maintenance, is in the end the dearest of any. A
person who can acquire no property, can have no other interest but to eat as
much, and to labour as little as possible." Quoted in J. MCPHERSON, supra, at
39 & SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 44, at 352.
232. C. MEE, supra note 78, at 254.
233. 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 342 (H.
Johnston ed. 1890-93). D. ROBINSON, supra note 52, at 233-34. Moreover,
"[a]ny student of the period must admit that with the occasional outbursts of
honest indignation against slavery and the slave trade there existed a great
deal of moral indifference and unconcern which allowed this great social
problem to develop." M. MELLON, supra note 97, at 165. In addition,
It was not so much that there was a serious difference of opinion in
1787 about slavery-rather, that there was no agreement about it,
no consensus, and, given the radical difference in circumstances, no
real prospect of arriving at one. Indeed, a serious debate might
expose and aggravate a cleavage that was still mostly latent.
D. ROBINSON, supra, at 223.
234. See supra notes 95, 231.
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Accepted and used throughout the colonies, 35 slavery was
the oldest form of forced labor in Western civilization.236
Because most whites considered blacks inferior beings, slavery
was especially agreeable.237 Owing to their background, white
Americans needed time to recognize the immorality of the sub-
ject; moreover, they needed time to implement that knowledge.
In 1787, the immorality of the institution was a minor concern,
if a concern at all.238 The primary issue was establishing a
nation that would overcome the problems experienced by the
states under the Articles of Confederation.239
235. J. STEWART, HOLY WARRIORS 5 (1976). A good summary of the
colonial law of slavery is Wiecek, The Statutory Law of Slavery and Race in the
Thirteen Mainland Colonies of British America, 34 WM. & MARY Q 258 (1977).
236. J. MCPHERSON, supra note 37, at 38.
237. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405, 407-08 (1857); W.
JORDAN, supra note 80, at 3-43.
238. M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION 110 (1913).
Another problem with Marshall's approach is his failure to offer the reader a
clear ethical basis to judge the morality of the framers' actions. The problem
is linked to his twentieth-century outlook. Even though today we realize the
immorality of slavery, our disgust with the practice is not representative of
the late eighteenth century. This was especially true of the Deep South's
position toward slavery; the region's attitude was not isolated. Slavery had
been a common practice in the colonies. J. STEWART, supra note 235, at 5.
Yet, at the time of the framing, only the Deep South still relied heavily on the
institution, because it had not developed other economic means of
production. See supra note 160. Based on the widespread use of slaves in the
colonies, one can reasonably infer that the views of the Deep South were
prevalent throughout the other states. That attitude lessened, however, as
the need for slaves diminished.
The Deep South, in particular, considered blacks inferior beings. The
color black was equated with baseness, filthiness, and sin, whereas the color
white represented purity, virginity, and virtue. W. JORDAN, supra note 80, at
3-43. As a result, blacks were considered unsuited for any freedom, whether
economic, emotional, intellectual, moral, political, or social. Scott, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) at 405, 407-08; R. BERNSTEIN, ARE WE To BE A NATION? 128
(1987). Because blacks had no rights-the main condition of slavery-they
could justifiably be placed into perpetual bondage. G. FREDRICKSON, WHITE
SUPREMACY 70 (1981). Although the Deep South was incorrect in its outlook
toward blacks, the opinion was widespread among the white community.
Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407. The opinion was neither disputed nor was it
thought to be open to dispute. Id. The view toward blacks and slavery was
even more solidified, because the Deep South's economy, politics, and social
structure depended on it. J. STEWART, supra, at 6, 7.
239. In 1781, the colonies were organized as states under the Articles. of
Confederation, The Articles preserved state independence by protecting
states' rights and decentralizing authority. Each state had its own local
constitution, its own currency, and could impose tariffs on each other's trade.
2J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 269 (R. Harrison, 23June 1788); M.JENSEN, THE
NEW NATION 25, 178, 322-23, 326, 344, 376 (1967).
Conversely, the Congress had almost no power. It only had the powers
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In judging the framers' product by the more developed
sociological and anthropological knowledge of the twentieth
century,2"' Justice Marshall's conclusions do a "disservice to
the cause of history." '241 Historical analysis should capture the
essence of the period under scrutiny and evaluate its events
within the context of that time frame. Historical inquiry should
demonstrate the differences of one age from another, so those
living today can benefit from the experiences of those living
yesterday.24 2 Historical inquiry should "recapture the richness
of the moments, the humanity of the men, the setting of exter-
nal circumstances, and the implications of events.... , In
these ways, the parties involved in a particular struggle and the
causes and effects of their judgments can best be understood to
assist the present and aid the future.24 4
Studying the past with reference to contemporary society
dismisses the occurrence of all intervening developments.245
relating to war and peace. These were the powers that the colonies
recognized as belonging to the King and the Parliament. The main problem
with the Articles was that the states refused to grant to the federal
government the powers that they refused to give to the Monarch and the
Parliament. The Congress could not lay taxes, regulate commerce, or punish
criminals. The Congress, therefore, was subordinate to the states. It
depended on the states for money and for the execution of its decrees. The
weaknesses of the Articles caused the national government to receive little
domestic or foreign respect and led the states to economic and political
chaos. M.JENSEN, supra, 43, 50, 73, 126, 259, 347. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 15-
22 (A. Hamilton &J. Madison).
Still, the inherent flaws in the confederation scheme were not truly
apparent until Shays's rebellion in 1786. The rebellion, led by Daniel Shays,
responded to Massachusetts's efforts to collect taxes from farmers to pay off
the state's Revolutionary War debt. Szatmary, Shays' Rebellion in Springfield, ii
SHAYS' REBELLION: SELECTED ESSAYS 1 (M. Kaufman ed. 1987). Shays and his
followers seized the courts to prevent tax collectors from foreclosing farms.
Id. at 1, 8, 11. They demanded remission of all taxation with the issue of a
large amount of paper money. Id. at 7. Seen nationally, the rebellion forced
the realization that political and economic reforms were essential. A strong,
national government was necessary to preserve local liberty. Too much
democracy existed, and the country was quickly slipping into anarchy.
Wehtje, Boston's Response to Disorder in the Commonwealth 1783-1787, in SHAYS'
REBELLION: SELECTED ESSAYS 64 (M. Kaufman ed. 1987).
240. Justice Marshall adopted the approach that history should be
analyzed from the present. His methodology is known as contemporaneity,
which asserts that only the values, methods, and ideas of the present are
worthy.
241. M. MELLON, supra note 97, at vi.
242. H. BUTrERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 36 (1931).
243. Id. at 69.
244. Id. at 11, 13.
245. Id. at 14.
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The faithful portrayal of earlier events is thereby precluded,
because the inferences the historian makes about prior happen-
ings are not drawn from the past, but from a blend of the past
and the present. 24 6 All intervening developments, therefore,
and the manner in which they have affected the present are
neglected. When viewed in this insular and distinct manner,
modern day society appears superior to earlier societies. As
such, history is not produced, but, rather, an illusion. 247
Even though historical analysis, completely unadulterated
by current attitudes and convictions is impossible, it should be
the ideal; it should be striven for. With that intention, the his-
torical examination in this student comment, unlike Marshall's,
has attempted to focus on what the framers thought and
accomplished in the climate and opinion of their own time.
Granted, Justice Marshall probably did not want to consider
the Philadelphia Convention as an historian; instead, he proba-
bly intended to view it as a constitutional interpreter and, to an
extent, as a black reformer-an advocate for a broader under-
standing of the Constitution today. As a constitutional inter-
preter, Marshall may be free or even required to make moral
judgments that he would not make as an historian. As a
reformer, Marshall's assault on the founding fathers demon-
strates his concern with the modern "original intent move-
ment," which calls for a constitutional jurisprudence guided by
the framers' intent.248 The problem with Marshall's position,
however, is its irrelevance to both the practical and abstract
considerations at the time of the country's founding.249
Doubtless, the framers' main purpose at the Philadelphia
Convention was to create a national government. 250 The fram-
246. Id. at 29.
247. Id.
248. On the original intent movement, see, e.g., L. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT
AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION (1988); Berger, 'Original Intention' in
Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH L. REV. 296 (1986); Bork, Original Intent:
The Only Legitimate Basis for Constitutional Decision Making, 26 JUDGES' J. 18
(1987); Bork, Original Intent and the Constitution, 7 HUMANITIES 22 (1986);
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885
(1985).
249. Historian Max Farrand noted that "[o]ur Constitution was a practical
piece of work for very practical purposes. It arose from the necessity of
existing conditions. It was designed to meet certain specific needs, and when
those were provided for, the work was completed." Farrand, The Federal
Constitution and the Defects of the Confederation, 2 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 532, 543
(1908).
250. The Philadelphia Convention was called for the "express purpose of
revising the Articles of Confederation" and making the principles within the
Articles "adequate to the exigencies of government, and the preservation of
19891
112 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LA ll, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 4
ers, however, could not have created a government and have
also abolished slavery. 251 The framers reasonably thought that
the Union." 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, 1786-1870, at 8 (1901); 1 J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at
120-39. The Constitution was established "to form a more perfect
union .. " U.S. CONST. preamble. Roger Sherman of Connecticut said that
"the object of our convention is to amend [the] defects [in the Articles of
Confederation.] I J. ELLIOT, supra, at 470 (30 June 1787). James Madison of
Virginia exclaimed that "[i]t was incumbent on us . . . to frame a republican
system . . . as will control all the evils which have been experienced." 3
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra, at 74. See also THE
FEDERALIST No. 14, at 64 (J. Madison) (M. Beloff 2d ed. 1987); id. No. 23 (A.
Hamilton).
251. The tone of Marshall's argument leaves the impression that he
thought the framers could have created a nation that included all of the
states, but did not include slavery. At least five reasons exist to explain why
slavery was not abolished during the period between the Revolutionary War
and the Philadelphia Convention: first, inertia; it had existed in the old
empire and as a result flourished in the New Republic. If it had been done
away with south of Pennsylvania, it would have required an economic,
political, and cultural revolution of great proportions. G. FREDRICKSON, supra
note 238, at 70; C. ROSSITER, supra note 136, at 31-32; K. STAMPP, supra note
231, at 15-17.
Second, apprehension that American society could not absorb the free
blacks, who were so numerous and culturally alien to whites. Such a move
would have required a change for the worse, according to many whites. C.
ROSSITER, supra, at 32. For example, James Galloway in the North Carolina
ratifying debates said: "It is impossible for us to be happy, if, after
manumission, [blacks] are to stay among us." 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at
101 (26July 1788).
Third, lack of imagination in giving the "emancipated slaves the substance
as well as the appearance of freedom." C. ROSSITER, supra, at 32.
Fourth, ideology; it was impossible for the majority of whites to think of
blacks as their equal. Id.
Fifth, private property, a concept to which the framers were committed; by
abolishing slavery, the framers would have taken private property away from
slaveholders. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 594 (C. C. Pinckney, 12 July
1787); S. LYND, CLASS CONFLICT, SLAVERY AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 181 (1968). See also infra note 285.
For many whites, the belief that blacks were a "brutish sort of people"
allowed them to justify asserting the innate rights of man while denying
blacks those same rights. W. BENNETT & T. EASTLAND, supra note 231, at 25.
As for the Declaration of Independence's statement that "all men are created
equal," Thomas Jefferson, the author of the Declaration, and other
Americans, did not believe blacks were included in the phrase. Id. at 26; M.
PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION 263 (1970). Jefferson
thought all men were equal only in their moral faculty. W. BENNETT & T.
EASTLAND, supra, at 26. In short, all men were the same because of their
moral sense. Id. The aim of the Declaration, however, was to assert the
rights of all white Americans as Englishmen. Over time, the distinction was
blurred to include all men, in spite of their race. Id. at 26-27. Thus, because
America was dedicated to the principles of liberty and equality, it could not
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the slave states would not have joined a union that did not pro-
tect the institution.25 2 They believed John Rutledge when he
told the federal convention: "The true question at present is
whether the Southern States shall or shall not be parties to the
Union." '253 They also believed his colleague General Charles
Pinckney when he told the delegates that "South Carolina and
Georgia cannot do without slaves." ' 25 4 The framers were con-
vinced, because the position of the Deep South never
wavered.255
By entering the union, those who opposed the inclusion of
slavery in the Constitution did not accept or endorse the con-
victions of those who favored the system.2 56 Instead, they tol-
erated the interests of the slave states in order to consolidate
the disparate interests of the states into one nation.257 Without
adopting a tolerant view of slavery, the framers could have pre-
dicted with reasonable certainty the Deep South's departure
from the Convention, the ensuing evaporation of the Conven-
tion, and the apparent end of their dream of unified advance-
ment toward concerted goals. Therefore, the framers'
steadfast desire to create a nation was appropriate. Exigent cir-
cumstances faced the states: they were experiencing political
and economical chaos; they were also fearing attack from the
British and Spanish Empires, which surrounded the states on
their northern, western, and southern sides. A newly designed
system of government was necessary to stabilize and protect
the states. Owing to the framers' underlying interest in tolerat-
ing slavery, their use of the concept was morally defensible.
Indeed, the concept of tolerance can be used incorrectly.
If the framers had tolerated the Deep South's use of slaves
accept blacks on those terms because of cultural background, prejudice, and
the like. C. ROSSITER, supra, at 32. In addition, during the Revolutionary War
period, "slavery was of central importance to both the southern and national
economies, and thus to the viability of the 'American system.' " SLAVERY IN
THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 44, at 256 (see also id. ch. 1, 2, & 3); 2 J.
ELLIOT, supra, at 115 (W. Heath, 30Jan. 1788);J. STEWART, supra note 235, at
5.
252. James Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson on November 24, 1787,
that "South Carolina and Georgia were inflexible on the point of the slaves."
M. KAMMEN, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 73 (1986). Other
delegates agreed. James Iredell, for example, told the North Carolina
ratifying convention that South Carolina and Georgia would not budge on
the matter. 4J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 100 (26 July 1788).
253. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 364 (21 Aug. 1787).
254. Id. at 371.
255. W. WIECEK, supra note 37, at 64.
256. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
257. Id.
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without aiming for a greater good, the framers would have
acted improperly. 25 8 Yet, the framers did not merely tolerate
the continuation of slavery for its own sake; they tolerated the
temporary continuation of the institution to establish a nation
in which the system had a better chance of being extin-
guished.2 59 Despite any naivety on the framers' part regarding
the ease in which slavery would vanish from the country and
despite any insensitivity on the framers' part regarding the
grave evil of slavery, the framers were prudent in their decision
to endure the continued life of the institution. Their tolerance
allowed the American people to enter into a living arrangement
with those who held contrary views.260 It also assured the
American people the time to come to the realization that the
institution was immoral. In so doing, it allowed some Ameri-
can people to implement the universal principles on which
America's freedom from Great Britain was based, in particular,
the principle that all men are created equal.26 '
Because the framers thought the states could best solve
their difficulties if they were unified,262 creating a nation took
precedence over all other problems.263 Owing to the intent of
the framers to achieve a greater good by tolerating what they
258. To illustrate further the concept of tolerance: if people tolerate a
crime for any reason other than to help the victim, they would be acting
incorrectly. But, if people tolerate a crime to achieve a greater good, for
example, not interfering to allow time for the police to arrive and arrest the
criminals, they would be acting correctly. Granted, the type of crime must be
considered. If people can help prevent a crime by actively stopping the
criminal, they should. But, if prudence dictates that they should not interfere
because their actions would not help apprehend the criminal, they should
wait for the police to arrive. The concept of tolerance is tricky. The main
element on which to focus is the intent of the tolerance, which should be to
achieve a greater good. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 26, 11-1I, Q. 64,
A. 7.
259. See infra notes 312-14 and accompanying text.
260. George Washington wrote to the Marquis de Lafayette on February
7, 1788: "It appears to me, then, little short of a miracle, that the Delegates
from so many different States (which States you know are also different from
each other in their manners, circumstances and prejudices) should unite in
forming a system of national Government." 29 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES 1745-99, at 409 (J.
Fitzpatrick ed. 1939) [hereinafter J. FITZPATRICK]. James Madison wrote to
Thomas Jefferson on October 24, 1787, that it was "impossible to consider
the degree of concord which ultimately prevailed as less than a miracle." I J.
MADISON, LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON 344 (1884).
261. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
262. See infra notes 263, 265-66, 286-87 and accompanying text. See also
THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 177 (J. Madison) (M. Beloff 2d ed. 1987).
263. See supra note 250.
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considered a lesser evil, they acted morally.2" James Madison
pointed out to the Virginia ratifying convention that South Car-
olina and Georgia would not have joined the union
without the temporary permission of [the slave] trade;
and if they were excluded from the Union, the conse-
quences might be dreadful to them and to us .... Great
as the evil is, a dismemberment of the Union would be
worse. If those states should disunite from the other
states for not indulging them in the temporary continu-
ance of this traffic, they might solicit and obtain aid from
foreign powers.
2 6 5
Patrick Henry voiced a similar concern to the Virginia ratifying
convention. He said:
As much as I deplore slavery, I see that prudence forbids
its abolition. . . . But is it practicable by any human
means, to liberate them, without producing the most
dreadful and ruinous consequences? We ought to pos-
264. A moral action can be achieved by tolerating an evil, if the intent is to
gain a greater good. This is a basic natural law position as found in SAINT
THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 26, II-I1, Q. 64, A. 7. The framers were exposed
to natural law. Eidsmoe, The Judeo-Christian Roots of the Constitution, in
RESTORING THE CONSTITUTION 1787-1987, at 71-99 (H. House ed. 1987). For
a detailed examination of American religious and philosophical thought, see
A. BEITZINGER, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 31-39 (1972);
W. HUDSON, RELIGION IN AMERICA 83-130 (3d ed. 1981); M. PERRY, THE
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 97-99 (1982); for an
examination of Judeo-Christian principles, see Armstrong, Law, Politics, and
the Social Sciences-A Troubled Trinity, 4 SIMON GREENLEAF L. REV. 119, 125-28
(1984-85).
Saint Thomas wrote that "[m]oral acts take their species according to
what is intended, and not according to what is beside the intention, since this
is accidental .... SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, supra, II-II, Q 64, A. 7. Saint
Thomas understood that tolerating a lesser evil to achieve a greater good
would cause two effects. Id. The two effects of the framers' actions were (1)
tolerating an evil, slavery, for (2) the greater good of establishing a union that
would allow for the system's end. To be sure, the framers' good intention
was not rendered unlawful, because it was in proportion to the end. Id. The
framers were only allowing the temporary extension of slavery to ensure the
creation of the union.
Historian William Wiecek wrote that the slavery compromise
demonstrated that the founding fathers thought "the highest good was
national union." W. WIECEK, supra note 37, at 73.
265. 3J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 453-54 (15June 1788). As gleaned from
James Madison's Federalist writings, Madison reasoned that to liberate the
slaves at the time of the Constitution's drafting would have violated the
rights of the rest of the American people to pursue happiness by causing the
destruction of the Union; therefore, Madison accepted the continuation of
slavery, because it achieved the greater good of establishing a nation. M.
WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION 226 (1987).
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sess them in the manner we have inherited them from
our ancestors, as their manumission is incompatible with
the felicity of the country.
2 66
Because slavery was essential to the Deep South's exist-
ence, 26 7 without its inclusion in the document, the framers
could have expected the region to discard the plans of creating
a strong federal government. 268 The reactions of the states to
a disbanded Convention can only be speculated. More than
likely, absent the union, various confederations would have
formed. Initially, three would have been established:269 (1) a
confederation of the New England states;2 70 (2) a confedera-
tion of the middle states, perhaps without New York, which
could have existed alone because of its grand harbor;2 71 and (3)
a confederation of the Southern states.2 7 2 A combination of
either New England and the middle states might have occurred,
or ten states in one confederation, Rhode Island by itself, and
South Carolina and Georgia in another. The states could also
have fallen back on the Articles of Confederation.
2 7 3 Of
course, without the Constitution, slavery would have been
more firmly rooted in those states that desired the system.2 7 4
Absent a general government to control state action, the states
266. 3J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 590-91 (24 June 1788).
267. Deep Southerners "were convinced that slavery was essential to the
peace of their society, and they suspected that those who lived where blacks
were sparse could never understand this fact." D. ROBINSON, supra note 52, at
210. For example, Rawlins Lowndes in the South Carolina ratifying
convention, voicing his concern about the trade provision, said:
In the first place, what cause was there for jealousy of our importing
negroes? Why confine us to twenty years, or rather why limit us at
all? . . . But they don't like our slaves, because they have none
themselves, and therefore want to exclude us from this great
advantage. Why should the Southern States allow ... this... [?]
4J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 272 (16 Jan. 1788).
268. See supra notes 61, 84-87, 163, 180-82, 252-55, 265-67 and
accompanying text; see also infra notes 286-87 and accompanying text. Berns,
supra note 101, at 25.
269. THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: FOR AND AGAINST 20 (J. Pole ed.
1987) [hereinafterJ. POLE].
270. The New England states were Connecticut, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and Rhode Island.
271. The middle states were New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania.
272. The Southern states were Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia.
273. Under the Articles of Confederation, the slave trade could continue
indefinitely. See THE FEDERALIST No. 38 (J. Madison). The Articles omit
reference to slavery.
274. 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 100 (J. Iredell, 26 July 1788); J. POLE,
supra note 269, at 19.
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would have retained complete sovereignty to do as they
wished.275 The elimination of the institution nationally for
those who desired it would have been lost or, at least,
postponed.27 6
Clearly, the framers wanted to draft a document that
would appease the majority of interests.2 7 7 The document did
not canonize the institution of slavery, as is evident from the
term's omission from the text.278 If it had, it would have been
morally flawed. 279 The framers omitted any reference to slav-
ery, because they knew the non-slave states would have dis-
agreed to a document that openly endorsed the institution.
2 8 0
275. 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 100 (J. Iredell, 26 July 1788). As
Alexander Hamilton noted: "A NATION without a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT is an
awful spectacle." THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 451 (M. Beloff 2d ed. 1987).
276. 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 231 (J. Iredell, 31 July 1788); C.
RosSITER, supra note 136, at 268.
277. Georgia delegate William Few wrote in his autobiography that "[oin
that principle of accommodation the business progressed, and after about
three months' arduous labor, a plan of Constitution was formed on principles
which did not altogether please anybody, but it was agreed to be the most
expedient that could be devised and agreed to." 3 M. FARRAND, supra note
34, at 423 (Oct. 1816).
Furthermore, in a November 10, 1787, letter to his son, Bushrod,
George Washington wrote:
Is it best for the States to unite, or not to unite? [T]hose who [agree
that the states should unite] and yet object to parts of [the
Constitution], would do well to consider that it does not lye [sic]
with any one State, or the minority of the States to superstruct a
Constitution for the whole. The separate interest, as far as it is
practicable, must be consolidated; and local views must be attended
to, as far as the nature of the case will admit. Hence it is that every
State has some objection to the present form and these objections
are directed to different points, that which is most pleasing to one is
obnoxious to another, and so vice versa. If then the Union of the
whole is a desirable object, the component parts must yield a little in
order to accomplish it.
2 J. FITZPATRICK, supra note 260, at 310 (emphasis in original). See also THE
FEDERALIST No. 85, at 449 (A. Hamilton) (M. Beloff2d ed. 1987).
278. On this matter, one author has noted that
considering that the subject of slavery was perhaps the most
inflammable question on the agenda and provoked sharp exchanges
each time it came up, one is tempted to conclude that the lack of any
direct allusion to it in the final version of the Constitution is
testimony to either the statesmanlike discreetness or lily-livered
mendacity of the delegates.
1 R. KLUGER, SIMPLEJUSTICE 37 (1975). This student comment supports the
former conclusion. Justice Marshall would support the latter.
279. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
280. Luther Martin said to the Maryland ratifying convention that the
framers "anxiously sought to avoid the admission of expressions which might
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Also, by classifying slaves as "other persons" the framers
achieved two goals: first, the slave states would join the nation,
because slavery was protected;28 1 second, the framers set the
impression that once freed, slaves would receive all the rights
enjoyed by whites.282
In light of the social, economic, and political ramifications
that slavery had for the slave states,28 abolition had to be
be odious in the ears of Americans, although they were willing to admit into
their system those things which the expressions signified." 3 M. FARRAND,
supra note 34, at 210 (29 Nov.. 1787). Roger Sherman wanted euphemisms
because the word "slave" was "not pleasing to some people." 2 id. at 415 (25
Aug. 1787); Berns, supra note 101, at 23.
281. One reason that no direct reference to slavery appears in the
Constitution was because slaves were the main form of property, save for
realty, in the states. If the Convention attempted to abolish the institution,
slaveholders would have furiously opposed it. The national government
could not have, nor would not have, forced abolition; abolition would have to
have been achieved at the local level. 1 R. KLUGER, supra note 278, at 37.
Also, the term had not been used in the Articles of Confederation. 2 J.
ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 451 (J. Wilson, 3 Dec. 1787).
282. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; Reynolds, Another View: Our Magnificent
Constitution, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1347 (1987). The word slavery first
appeared in the Constitution by way of the thirteenth amendment. The
words race and color first entered the document through the fifteenth
amendment. The words black and white have always been absent from the
Constitution. Goldwin, supra note 50, at 28.
On February 1, 1820, Jonathan Roberts, a Senator from Pennsylvania,
asked his colleagues during a debate on the Missouri question:
Why is a circumlocution of words used in [the Constitution], to
designate such persons, instead of one so appropriate as that of
slaves? Either because it was considered as a painful word, or for
the better reason, that it was hoped the Constitution would survive a
state of things where the word would be applicable. In either case,
emancipation must have been looked to as a desirable event, and a
righteous consummation of the promises of the Revolution.
35 ANNALS OF CONG. 340 (1820).
283. From the Georgia frontier up through the Virginia tidewaters and
Maryland, slavery influenced almost every aspect "of the region's economic
life, social customs, and political institutions." J. STEWART, supra note 235, at
6. At the start of the eighteenth century, many Southern whites (especially
Deep Southerners) considered slave labor as a "prerequisite for order,
liberty, and prosperity," because it eliminated the potential problem of an
unruly population of lower-class whites. Id. at 7; J. MCPHERSON, supra note
37, at 33; Morgan, Slavery and Freedom: The American Paradox, 59J. AM. HIST. 5,
25 (June 1972); SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 44, at 261.
Slavery was ingrained in the South. By the early 1770s, 35 to 40% of the
Southern population was black. D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 27, at 15; J.
STEWART, supra, at 7. In Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia, slaves made
up 30 to 40% of the population. J. STEWART, supra, at 7. In parts of the
coastal areas of South Carolina, whites were in the minority, with one white
for every five blacks. Id. But, not every white Southerner owned a slave. In
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achieved without severely disrupting what it influenced. 28 4 As
a result of their association under the Articles of Confedera-
tion, the states were in no condition to withstand a social
revolution.2 85  The abolition of slavery at the framing, there-
fore, would have been disastrous. George Nicholas asked the
Virginia ratifying convention: "As the Southern States would
not confederate without [the slave trade] clause, . . . [would]
gentlemen . . . rather dissolve the confederacy than to suffer
this temporary inconvenience, admitting it to be such?"
286
And, John Rutledge said to the Philadelphia Convention:
"Had we not better keep the Government up a little longer,
hoping that another Convention will supply our omissions,
than abandon everything to hazard? ' 287
As lawmakers, the framers were responsible for drafting
laws that would lead people to virtue,288 that is, move people
Delaware, eastern Maryland, eastern and northern Virginia, and parts of
North Carolina, slaves were seldom owned. Id. at 8. The economy in those
areas was based on family farming and commercial activity. Id. Of those who
owned slaves in the South, the majority held less than five. R. BERNSTEIN,
supra note 238, at 5. The exception to that rule was the large slaveholders,
who were found in the Deep South. J. STEWART, supra, at 8. Although the
ownership of slaves varied in the South, as it did in the North, the South,
particularly the Deep South, had a greater dependence on the institution for
its economic, social, and political order. Id. at 5-6. Stemming from the long
tradition of slavery in the Deep South, the moral implications were not deeply
considered. For more on the matter, see also A. H. Stephens, Corner Stone
Speech at Savannah, 'Georgia (Mar. 21, 1861), reprinted in H. CLEVELAND,
ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE WITH LETTERS AND
SPEECHES, BEFORE, DURING, AND SINCE THE WAR 721 (1866). On the
Southern plantation society, see F. GAINES, THE SOUTHERN PLANTATION
(1925); 1-2 L. GRAY, HISTORY OF AGRICULTURE IN THE SOUTHERN UNITED
STATES TO 1860 (1933).
284. J. STEWART, supra note 235, at 6. During the Revolutionary period,
"slavery was of central importance to both the southern and national
economies, and thus to the viability of the 'American system.' " SLAVERY IN
THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 44, at 256.
285. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
286. 3J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 456 (15 June 1788).
287. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 34, at 19 (15 Jan. 1788).
288. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 26, I-I, Q. 96, A. 2. According to
Saint Thomas, virtue is simply a good operative habit. Id., I-II, Q. 55, A. 1-4.
It "is the habit of perfecting man in view of his doing good deeds." Id., I-II,
Q. 58, A. 3. The purpose of virtue, therefore, is to mold men. It protects
human nature from the influences that would lead to its deterioration. In
short, "[v]irtue breaks down the barriers to full, free, human living, sets the
powers of man ever more free, free enough ultimately to soar up to God
Himself." 2 W. FARRELL, A COMPANION TO THE SUMMA 193 (1939). Put
another way, virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live
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away from licentiousness; 289 the framers thought licentiousness
led people to tyranny. 290 But laws should lead people to virtue
in a gradual fashion. 29' Sudden change causes greater distur-
bance, because the non-virtuous are unable to adapt swiftly to
the new laws and are instead led to greater evil.
29 2
The framers wanted to achieve a nation in which gradual
change would take place to ensure national stability. 29 3 Each
framer realized that a solid federal government first needed to
be established before the country could solve the tough
problems it faced.29 4 The purpose of the framers was to rec-
ommend a system of government that would unite the states.29 5
righteously. Virtues are great goods that come from God, which He works in
us and without us. SAINT AUGUSTINE, supra note 26, at 80-83.
In describing the United States Constitution, Robert Goldwin wrote:
A good constitution provides guidance and structure for the
improvement of the society. A good constitution is designed to
make the political society better than it is, and the citizens better
persons. It must be close enough to the institutions and the people
as they are to be relevant to the working of the society in its everyday
activities, but it should also have what might be called formative
features, a capacity to make us better if we live according to its
provisions and adhere to its institutional arrangements.
Goldwin, supra note 50, at 31. On the guidance the Constitution provides to
inform and shape American political life and public policy in terms of ethical
norms and values, see the essays contained in STILL THE LAW OF THE LAND?
ESSAYS ON CHANGING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION (J. McNamara
ed. 1987). See also infra notes 289-90.
289. McDonald & McDonald, A Republic, Madam, If You Can Keep It, 4
NOTRE DAMEJ. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 7, 9 (1989).
290. The framers held common beliefs. In particular, they were
preoccupied with the mortality of republics. The framers considered the
spread and maintenance of public virtue the key to preserving the republic.
Id. The framers thought the decline in public virtue-the increase of vice-
would cause the decline of the republic. With the decline of public virtue
would come an increase of vice and licentiousness. Licentiousness would
lead to anarchy, and anarchy would eventually degenerate to tyranny. Id.
The result would be the republic's destruction.
291. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 26, I-I, Q. 96, A. 2.
292. Id.
293. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 177 (J. Madison) (M. Beloff2d ed. 1987);
id. No. 43 (J. Madison).
294. See supra notes 262-63, 265-66, 286-87 and accompanying text.
Richard Harrison told the New York ratifying convention that "a close union
is essential to the prosperity of states; that, therefore, some measures should
be pursued to strengthen that union, and prevent a dissolution." 2J. ELLIOT,
supra note 35, at 269 (23 June 1788). THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 451 (A.
Hamilton) (M. Beloff 2d ed. 1987).
295. See supra notes 249, 264 and accompanying text. According to
historian William Wiecek, the framers thought "the highest good was
national union." W. WIECEK, supra note 37, at 73.
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The federal legislature would thereafter be responsible for
keeping the states harmoniously together.296 George Washing-
ton's statement shortly after the federal convention indicated
the framers' position. He wrote:
The Constitution .. .is not free from imperfections, but
there are as few radical defects in it as could well be
expected considering the heterogeneous mass of which
the Convention was composed and the diversity of the
interests that are to be attended to. [A] Constitutional
door is opened for future amendments and
alterations.297
James Madison agreed. He thought it was incumbent on the
framers' successors to improve the document to "guard[ ]
equally against that extreme facility, which would render the
constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty, which
might perpetuate its discovered faults.- 298
The framers included article V to assure the perpetual
improvement of the Constitution. 29 9 The cumbrous nature of
the amendment process guaranteed that the flaws in society
could be altered, while the essential integrity of the document's
structure would be safeguarded."' ° What the framers drafted
in 1787 represented the country's prevalent attitude.3 0 ' The
296. C. BOWEN, supra note 93, at 204.
297. 29 J. FITZPATRICK, supra note 260, at 287. See also THE FEDERALIST
No. 85, at 448-49 (A. Hamilton) (M. Beloff 2d ed. 1987).
298. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 224-25 (J. Madison) (M. Beloff 2d ed.
1987).
299. The fifth article to the United States Constitution provides, in part:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem
it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on
the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several
States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in
either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of
the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the
one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress....
300. Reynolds, supra note 282, at 1349; THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 224-25
(J. Madison) (M. Beloff2d ed. 1987). As Frederick Douglass observed, article
V, "if made to refer to the African slave trade at all, makes the Constitution
anti-slavery rather than for slavery, for it says to the slave States, the price you
will have to pay for coming into the American Union is, that the slave trade,
which you would carry on indefinitely out of the Union, shall be put an end to
in twenty years if you come into the Union .... [T]he intentions of the
framers of the Constitution were good, not bad .... 2 LIFE AND WRITINGS,
supra note 1, at 473.
301. Historian Forrest McDonald once stated:
The framers were guided by principles but not by formulas. They
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framers correctly assumed that the national consensus would
change during the country's lifetime. 0 2 Hence, the document
had to reflect that growth. 03 For example, when the social
consensus toward slavery changed after the Civil War, three
amendments were adopted to reflect that different attitude.30 4
The amendments took what the document had tolerated and
made it constitutionally impermissible: blacks were no longer
enslaved; 3 5 blacks were acknowledged to be legally equal to
whites;30 6 and, blacks had the right to vote.30 7 Granted, the
additions were the product of a violent war, a war that repre-
sented the end of the nation's tolerance of slavery. Yet, the
amendments did not create a new Constitution as Justice Mar-
shall contended.30 8 They represented the document's ability to
adapt. The amendments grew, therefore, from the intent of
the framers and of their product: they were the framers' pre-
dicted growth for the document. Furthermore, the amend-
understood that no formula or system of government is universally
desirable or workable; instead, if government is to be viable, it must
be made to conform to human nature and to the genius of the
people-to their customs, morals, habits, institutions, and
aspirations. The framers did just that, and thereby used old
materials to create a new order for the ages.
F. McDonald, The Sixteenth Annual Jefferson Lecture (May 6, 1987) (Spon-
sored by the National Endowment for the Humanities).
302. 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 176-77 (J. Iredell, 29 July 1788);
Reynolds, supra note 282, at 1350.
303. Thomas Jefferson wrote to Edward Carrington on August 4, 1787,
that even "with all the imperfections of our present government, it is without
comparison the best existing or that ever did exist." 4 WRITINGS OF
JEFFERSON 423-25 (P. Ford ed. 1895). Albert Newsome wrote:
So adept have been the American people in the art of self-
government that the Federal Constitution has survived in a world of
crashing empires, tottering thrones, and changing governments as
the oldest operating written constitution among the nations of the
world. Under [the] Constitution, the people of this American
republic have achieved permanent union, political stability, and
national greatness.
Newsome, North Carolina's Ratification of the Federal Constitution, 17 N. C. HIST.
REV. 287 (Oct. 1940). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 451 (A. Hamilton)
(M. Beloff 2d ed. 1987).
304. The thirteenth amendment was adopted in 1865; the fourteenth
amendment was adopted in 1868; the fifteenth amendment was adopted in
1870. The three amendments are often called the Civil War amendments.
305. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
306. Id. amend. XIV.
307. Id. amend. XV.
308. Marshall, infra, at app. 128. If a new Constitution was created after
the inclusion of the Civil War amendments, are the United States Supreme
Court decisions prior to the amendments still valid? Did the branches of
government survive the Civil War? Reynolds, supra note 282, at 1349.
ANOTHER LOOK
ments emphasized that the nation was strong enough to
acknowledge the universal principles on which its freedom
from Great Britain was founded, and, more importantly, they
underscored that the nation was strong enough to implement
that knowledge.
In crafting a new nation, the framers acted prudently. As
will be affirmed in the conclusion, the framers' decisions
resulted in a moral document.
CONCLUSION
In his speech, Justice Marshall called the United States
Constitution a product of moral compromise and the frame-
work of a defective government.3 0 9 He rested the blame on our
founding fathers.3 "' In particular, Marshall blamed those fram-
ers who initially opposed slavery's inclusion in the document
but who later agreed to it.3 1 Yet, as this student comment has
shown, those men did not act immorally. They made a morally
defensible decision when they admitted the slavery provisions
into the document. They intended to bring about a greater
good-a new nation-by tolerating a lesser evil-slavery.3 12
The document they drafted did not accept the institution;
accordingly, it did not give permanent life to slavery. 1 3 What
the framers constructed was a system of government that satis-
fied the needs of eighteenth-century American society but that
also had the ability to amend the wrongs of that society.3" 4
The achievement-the moral achievement-of the Consti-
tution is that it permitted the moral advancements that Mar-
shall applauded in his speech. The weight and direction of the
movement, starting with the document, was to eradicate slav-
ery.31 5 The movement was morally built into the Constitution
309. Marshall, infra, at app. 126-28.
310. Id. at app. 125-29.
311. Id. at app. 127.
312. See supra notes 256-61, 264 and accompanying text.
313. For example, General William Heath exclaimed to the Massachusetts
ratifying convention: "The federal Convention went as far as they could.
The migration or importation . . . is confined to the states now existing only;
new states cannot claim it." 2J. ELLIOT, supra note 35, at 115 (30Jan. 1788)
(emphasis in original). See supra notes 105, 210-12 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 149, 163, 214-16, 218-21 and accompanying text.
"Simply to have made it possible for the new government to move against the
slave trade in twenty years (and to tax it in the meantime) was as decisive a
victory for human decency as men who loved the Union and hated slavery
could have won at Philadelphia." Rossiter, supra note 136, at 268 (emphasis
added).
315. The slave trade clause demonstrates one anti-slavery aspect that the
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with the 1808 provision and the amendment process."1 6 For
these reasons, the founding fathers should be respected and
given credit.
Despite Justice Marshall's disagreement, 317 the Constitu-
tion was a product of its time. It was designed to reflect the
nation's evolving attitudes. It remains, as such, an incomplete
but moral document, which is a product of our own time as
well. The genius of the document is its provision for its own
future change: it can be altered to correct the wrongs of our
past and secure the promises of tomorrow. It has the ability,
therefore, to allow our nation to realize and adopt basic, uni-
versal principles-the paramount one being the respect and
preservation of all human life. The decision to make the
changes, however, rests with the American people and not with
the document itself. As in the past, the fate of our country is in
our hands.
founding fathers anticipated. Just "the states now existing" could import
slaves; the Congress, therefore, had implicit power to prevent states beyond
the original 13 from importing slaves. The Congress used this implicit power
in 1798 and 1804. The 1798 Act precluded the Mississippi Territory from
participating in the international slave traffic, and the 1804 Act placed a
similar prohibition on the southern portion of the Louisiana Purchase. W.
WIECEK, supra note 37, at 74.
As historian William Wiecek stated: "[t]he framers meant to prevent the
spread of slavery into new states via the international slave trade." Id. The
Deep South was agreeable to this position, because it was concerned more
with preserving slavery within its region than in extending the institution
elsewhere. Id. The Deep South wanted to make the fullest use of slavery on
its own land. Id.
The slave trade was abolished onJanuary 1, 1808. 2 Stat. 426-30 (1808).
See D. ROBINSON, supra note 52, at 324-38, for a discussion of the Act's
legislative history. Despite the abolition of the slave trade, the law was not
fully enforced up until the outbreak of the Civil War. For an examination of
the matter, see W. DuBois, supra note 1 11; W. HOWARD, AMERICAN SLAVERS
AND THE FEDERAL LAW, 1837-1862 (1963).
316. Along similar lines, Professor Walter Berns commented that, based
on the three-fifths, fugitive slave, and slave trade clauses, "the Constitution
was, to the greatest extent possible, an anti-slavery document." Berns, supra
note 101, at 24; see also LIFE AND TIMES, supra note 1, at 260-61.
317. Marshall, infra, at app. 127-28.
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APPENDIX
REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE THURGOOD
MARSHALL AT THE ANNUAL SEMINAR OF THE SAN
FRANCISCO PATENT AND TRADEMARK LAW
ASSOCIATION IN MAUI, HAWAII, MAY 6, 1987*
The year 1987 marks the two hundredth anniversary of the
United States Constitution. A Commission has been estab-
lished to coordinate the celebration. The official meetings,
essay contests, and festivities have begun.
The planned commemoration will span three years, and I
am told 1987 is "dedicated to the memory of the founders and
the document they drafted in Philadelphia."' We are to "recall
the achievements of our founders and the knowledge and expe-
rience that inspired them, the nature of the government they
established, its origins, its character, and its ends, and the
rights and privileges of citizenship, as well as its attendant
responsibilities." 2
Like many anniversary celebrations, the plan for 1987
takes particular events and holds them up as the source of all
the very best that has followed. Patriotic feelings will surely
swell, prompting proud proclamations of the wisdom, fore-
sight, and sense of justice shared by the framers and reflected
in a written document now yellowed with age. This is unfortu-
nate-not the patriotism itself, but the tendency for the cele-
bration to oversimplify, and overlook the many other events
that have been instrumental to our achievements as a nation.
The focus of this celebration invites a complacent belief that
the vision of those who debated and compromised in Philadel-
phia yielded the "more perfect Union" it is said we now enjoy.
I cannot accept this invitation, for I do not believe that the
meaning of the Constitution was forever "fixed" at the Phila-
delphia Convention. Nor do I find the wisdom, foresight, and
sense ofjustice exhibited by the framers particularly profound.
To the contrary, the government they devised was defective
* Justice Marshall has permitted the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics &
Public Policy to reprint his remarks in this Appendix. His speech has been
reprinted verbatim, except for stylistic changes, including putting long
quotations into block form and adding footnote 11 to document the
quotation from Scott v. Sandford more clearly.
1. PREPARATION FOR A COMMEMORATION: FIRST FULL YEAR'S REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
6 (1986).
2. FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 6 (1985).
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from the start, requiring several amendments, a civil war, and
momentous social transformation to attain the system of con-
stitutional government, and its respect for the individual free-
doms and human rights, we hold as fundamental today. When
contemporary Americans cite "The Constitution," they invoke
a concept that is vastly different from what the framers barely
began to construct two centuries ago.
For a sense of the evolving nature of the Constitution we
need look no further than the first three words of the docu-
ment's preamble: "We the People." When the founding
fathers used this phrase in 1787, they did not have in mind the
majority of America's citizens. "We the People" included, in
the words of the framers, "the whole Number of free
Persons."
3
On a matter so basic as the right to vote, for example,
Negro slaves were excluded, although they were counted for
representational purposes-at three-fifths each. Women did
not gain the right to vote for over a hundred and thirty years.4
These omissions were intentional. The record of the fram-
ers' debates on the slave question is especially clear: The
Southern states acceded to the demands of the New England
states for giving Congress broad power to regulate commerce,
in exchange for the right to continue the slave trade. The eco-
nomic interests of the regions coalesced: New Englanders
engaged in the "carrying trade" would profit from transporting
slaves from Africa as well as goods produced in America by
slave labor. The perpetuation of slavery ensured the primary
source of wealth in the Southern states.
Despite this clear understanding of the -role slavery would
play in the new republic, use of the words "slaves" and "slav-
ery" was carefully avoided in the original document. Political
representation in the lower House of Congress was to be based
on the population of "free Persons" in each State, plus three-
fifths of all "other Persons." 5 Moral principles against slavery,
for those who had them, were compromised, with no explana-
tion of the conflicting principles for which the American Revo-
lutionary War had ostensibly been fought: the self-evident
truths "that all men are created equal, that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." 6
3. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
4. Id. amend. XIX.
5. Id. art. 1, § 2.
6. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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It was not the first such compromise. Even these ringing
phrases from the Declaration of Independence are filled with
irony, for an early draft of what became that Declaration
assailed the King of England for suppressing legislative
attempts to end the slave trade and for encouraging slave
rebellions.7 The final draft adopted in 1776 did not contain
this criticism. And so again at the Constitutional Convention
eloquent objections to the institution of slavery went
unheeded, and its opponents eventually consented to a docu-
ment which laid a foundation for the tragic events that were to
follow.
Pennsylvania's Gouverneur Morris provides an example.
He opposed slavery and the counting of slaves in determining
the basis for representation in Congress. At the Convention he
objected that
the inhabitant of Georgia [or] South Carolina who goes
to the Coast of Africa, and in defiance of the most sacred
laws of humanity tears away his fellow creatures from
their dearest connections and damns them to the most
cruel bondages, shall have more votes in a Government
instituted for protection of the rights of mankind, than
the Citizen of Pennsylvania or NewJersey who views with
a laudable horror, so nefarious a practice.'
And yet Gouverneur Morris eventually accepted the three-fifths
accommodation. In fact, he wrote the final draft of the Consti-
tution, the very document the bicentennial will commemorate.
As a result of compromise, the right of the Southern states
to continue importing slaves was extended, officially, at least
until 1808. We know that it actually lasted a good deal longer,
as the framers possessed no monopoly on the ability to trade
moral principles for self-interest. But they nevertheless set an
unfortunate example. Slaves could be imported, if the com-
mercial interests of the North were protected. To make the
compromise even more palatable, customs duties would be
imposed at up to ten dollars per slave as a means of raising
public revenues.9
No doubt it will be said, when the unpleasant truth of the
history of slavery in America is mentioned during this bicenten-
nial year, that the Constitution was a product of its times, and
embodied a compromise which, under other circumstances,
7. See C. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 147 (1942).
8. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 222 (M.
Farrand ed. 1911).
9. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
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would not have been made. But the effects of the framers'
compromise have remained for generations. They arose from
the contradiction between guaranteeing liberty and justice to
all, and denying both to Negroes.
The original intent of the phrase, "We the People," was far
too clear for any ameliorating construction. Writing for the
Supreme Court in 1857, Chief Justice Taney penned the fol-
lowing passage in the Dred Scott case,' 0 on the issue whether, in
the eyes of the framers, slaves were "constituent members of
the sovereignty," and were to be included among "We the
People":
We think they are not, and that they are not
included, and were not intended to be included....
They had for more than a century before been
regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether
unfit to associate with the white race... ; and so far infer-
ior, that they had no rights which the white man was
bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and
lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.
[A]ccordingly, a negro of the African race was
regarded . . . as an article of property, and held, and
bought and sold as such....
[N]o one seems to have doubted the correctness of
the prevailing opinion of the time.''
And so, nearly seven decades after the Constitutional Con-
vention, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the prevailing opinion
of the framers regarding the rights of Negroes in America. It
took a bloody civil war before the thirteenth amendment could
be adopted to abolish slavery, though not the consequences
slavery would have for the future Americans.
While the Union survived the Civil War, the Constitution
did not. In its place arose a new, more promising basis for jus-
tice and equality, the fourteenth amendment, ensuring protec-
tion of the life, liberty, and property of all persons against
deprivations without due process, and guaranteeing equal pro-
tection of the laws. And yet almost another century would pass
before any significant recognition was obtained of the rights of
black Americans to share equally even in such basic opportuni-
ties as education, housing, and employment, and to have their
10. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
11. Id. at 404, 407-08.
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votes counted, and counted equally. In the meantime, blacks
joined America's military to fight its wars and invested untold
hours working in its factories and on its farms, contributing to
the development of this country's magnificent wealth and wait-
ing to share in its prosperity.
What is striking is the role legal principles have played
throughout America's history in determining the condition of
Negroes. They were enslaved by law, emancipated by law, dis-
enfranchised and segregated by law; and, finally, they have
begun to win equality by law. Along the way, new constitu-
tional principles have emerged to meet the challenges of a
changing society. The progress has been dramatic, and it will
continue.
The men who gathered in Philadelphia in 1787 could not
have envisioned these changes. They could not have imagined,
nor would they have accepted, that the document they were
drafting would one day be construed by a Supreme Court to
which had been appointed a woman and the descendent of an
African slave. "We the People" no longer enslave, but the
credit does not belong to the framers. It belongs to those who
refused to acquiesce in outdated notions of "liberty," "justice,"
and "equality," and who strived to better them.
And so we must be careful, when focusing on the events
which took place in Philadelphia two centuries ago, that we not
overlook the momentous events which followed, and thereby
lose our proper sense of perspective. Otherwise, the odds are
that for many Americans the bicentennial celebration will be
little more than a blind pilgrimage to the shrine of the original
document now stored in a vault in the National Archives. If we
seek, instead, a sensitive understanding of the Constitution's
inherent defects, and its promising evolution through two hun-
dred years of history, the celebration of the "Miracle at Phila-
delphia"' 2 will, in my view, be a far more meaningful and
humbling experience. We will see that the true miracle was not
the birth of the Constitution, but its life, a life nurtured
through two turbulent centuries of our own making, and a life
embodying much good fortune that was not.
Thus, in this bicentennial year, we may not all participate
in the festivities with flag-waving fervor. Some may more qui-
etly commemorate the suffering, struggle, and sacrifice that has
triumphed over much of what was wrong with the original doc-
ument, and observe the anniversary with hopes not realized
and promises not fulfilled. I plan to celebrate the bicentennial
12. C. BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA (1966).
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of the Constitution as a living document, including the Bill of
Rights and the other amendments protecting individual free-
doms and human rights.
